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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and problem set 
The postal reform of Switzerland in 1998 marked the beginning of the 
liberalization process of the Swiss postal market1. Against the background of the 
liberalization of network industries in the European Union (EU), the former public 
undertaking PTT was split up into the two public enterprises Swiss Post and Swisscom, 
the latter being corporatized. Thereby, the postal monopoly that had lasted for more 
than 150 years was reduced2 and assigned to Swiss Post. Swiss Post was in turn obliged 
to take over public missions, namely the universal provision in Switzerland with postal 
services and payment services.  
It is important to note that now – in contrast to the past3 – the postal monopoly 
was primarily legitimated as a means to finance universal services. Consequently, and 
in the light of the developments in the European postal market, the new postal act 
empowered the government to reduce the monopoly if the financing of universal 
services remained guaranteed4. In 2002, the parliament approved the government’s 
vision on a further partial market opening5. Accordingly, the parcels market was 
completely liberalized in 2004, and the letters market for addressed mail weighing more 
                                                     
1  Postal Law and Postal Organization Act as of 1998. 
2  The monopoly was abolished for outbound mail, express mail, and parcels weighting 
more than 2 kg.  
3  In the past, reserved services have primarily been justified to avoid inefficient duplication 
of infrastructures (see Knieps 2005 for an overview) and for reasons of national security. 
Further, many states regarded postal services as a means to collect taxes. Even Adam 
Smith (1776) considered postal services as a legitimate public business to improve the 
finances of the state. Interestingly, up to the First World War (introduction of income tax) 
the primary income of the Swiss state was customs and postal profits.   
4  Cf. Postal Law, Art. 3. 
5  “Gesamtschau zur weiteren Entwicklung des Postwesens in der Schweiz – Bericht des 
Bundesrates und Botschaft über die Änderung des Postorganisationsgesetzes”, Mai 2002. 
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than 100 grams was opened to competition in 20066. Meanwhile, the government is 
about to completely revise the postal law. The main issues are the possible complete 
liberalization of the postal market (i.e. abolishment of Swiss Post’s residual monopoly), 
the definition of universal services and its financing, the regulatory framework, and the 
corporatization of Swiss Post7.  
The current postal act reduces the complex question of liberalization to mainly one 
dimension, namely whether the financing of the universal service remains ensured. By 
suppressing political issues, this question is quickly answered from a purely economic 
view: The monopoly can be abolished, if either  
− non-binding universal service constraints are imposed, i.e. there is no need 
for a financing instrument because universal services are provided by the 
market, or 
− there exist other suitable financing instruments such as government 
subsidies, compensation funds, or “pay or play” mechanisms8. Thereby, in 
particular government subsidies are a powerful tool, as it is possible to 
finance virtually any desired level of universal services by accordingly 
stressing the tax payers’ wallet. Technically, subsidies are even more 
powerful than reserved services, as the latter’s upper limit is given by the 
profit maximizing monopoly price, while tax revenues are restricted by the 
Laffer effect only9.  
Thus, from a descriptive and economic point of view one can say: “There is no 
need for a postal monopoly to finance postal universal services“. The most prominent 
ambassador of this standpoint is the European Commission itself. Based on 
                                                     
6  Based on an evaluation commissioned by PostReg (WIK 2005). 
7  Press Release of the federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and 
Communications (DETEC) as of 3rd Mai 2006 and subsequent decisions. 
8  Cf. Oxera (2007) for a comprehensive overview and discussion on financing instruments. 
Public procurements are not to be considered as a financing instrument as they are a 
means to determine the cost of USO by the market (which needs to be financed somehow). 
9  Needless to say, this is a purely economic argument without any reference to its political 
feasibility.   
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comprehensive studies on the above question10 and aiming for a full market opening, the 
Commission published a heavily debated proposal for a full market opening in 200911. In 
2008, the European Parliament and Council finally approved an amendment of the 
postal directive12 that will abolish reserved services in the EC (European Communities) 
completely by 2011 or 201313. Hence, the European member states will be forced to 
finance their universal services by other means than reserved areas. Compared to the 
European member states, all possible financing instruments remain on the table in 
Switzerland which is not bound by European Directives14.   
From an economic point of view, compared to the financing question as raised 
above, there is a far more important and complex set of questions to be answered: What 
is the welfare maximizing regulation of the Swiss letters market? Should we liberalize the 
letters market completely, and if so, how?  
To answer these questions, we propose a two-step approach. In a first step, 
Switzerland has to define the level of universal service it wants to provide to its 
economy. In a second step, given this definition of universal service, it is possible to 
                                                     
10 Cf. PWC(2006), WIK (2004, 2006), ecorys (2005). Note that none of these studies assesses 
the welfare consequences of a full market opening. The only prospective approach is 
found PWC (2006). The study analyzes the impact of a full market opening on the 
incumbents balance to finance for various levels of universal service constraints. The 
authors conclude, that a full market opening is “feasible” provided that Universal Services 
are properly defined (“adapted to the market”) and flanking measures are available.  
11  European Commission, COM (2006) 594, Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 97/67/EC concerning the full 
accomplishment of the internal market of Community postal services.  
12  Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
97/67/EC concerning the full accomplishment of the internal market of Community postal 
services. Cf. Trinkner (2008) for a discussion of the Directive. 
13 Two additional years for new member states, Luxembourg and Greece.  
14  Technically, the European aim of harmonization of the internal market was in Switzerland 
already reached in 1849, when the former cantonal postal administrations were merged in 
the federal administration PTT. Cf. Finger (2004) for an historical overview for Swiss Post’s 
(and PTT’s) development. 
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evaluate the various financing means including corresponding market regimes in terms 
of efficiency and overall welfare. The financing means with the best combination of (a) 
static and dynamic effects on overall welfare and (b) risk of potential system failure is 
economically the one to prefer over the other ones.  
For the case of Switzerland, there is little research available for both sets of 
questions. The main research questions addressed by this book are in the broad field of 
the second step. We focus on the key issue, whether a full market opening of the Swiss 
letters market is economically desirable given the current level of universal service 
obligations in Switzerland.  
1.2 Outline of the book 
The book builds mainly on four papers which have been published by the author 
between 2005 and 2007. The book provides a synthesis of this previous work and 
punctually deepens selected issues.  Nevertheless the individual chapters can be read 
independently from each other.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the demand side of the postal market and analyzes the 
drivers of Swiss mail volumes by applying time-series analysis. In particular, we 
compute price-elasticities and assess whether e-substitution was present in the past.  E-
substitution is key in postal operator’s strategic planning and also affects innovation 
incentives in monopolized mail markets. Based on the results we provide forecasts of 
future mail demand. 15  
Chapter 3 deepens selected issues on the supply side of the postal market. It 
provides an over-view on the postal value chain and focuses on the economics on mail 
delivery. Using econometrical cross-section methods, we compute economies of scale, 
density and scope. These are crucial for the economic costs of a duplication of 
                                                     
15  Chapter bases on Trinkner and Grossmann (2006). 
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distribution networks. We further discuss the issue of the contestability of the postal 
market and whether mail delivery hast to be considered a natural monopoly.16 
Chapter 4 presents the core of the book, a game-theoretic entry model of the Swiss 
letters market. It aims at comparing the welfare effects of a full market opening 
compared to Switzerland’s current residual monopoly as well as “worksharing”, the 
current US regulatory framework. We further discuss the main findings of the literature 
on access with bypass and draw our conclusions.17 
Chapter 5 analyzes optimal pricing strategies in letters markets. In particular, we 
focus on the question whether postal operators should charge receivers too.  This leads 
us to the important question, whether postal markets are two-sided. If so, this would 
draw important implications for postal operators and regulatory authorities. 18 
We add our concluding remarks in Chapter 6. We highlight the natural conflict 
between universal service obligations and full market opening. Finally we summarize 
our results among the various chapters on the question whether the Swiss Mail market 
should be liberalized completely from an overall welfare point of view. 
                                                     
16  Chapter bases on Farsi, Filippini and Trinkner (2006). 
17  Chapter bases on Dietl, Trinkner and Bleisch (2005). 
18  Chapter bases on Jaag and Trinkner (2008a). We also give a brief overview on the findings 
in Felisberto, Finger, Friedli, Krähenbühl, and Trinkner (2006) and Friedli, Jaag, 
Krähenbühl, Nielsen, Pihl and Trinkner (2006). 
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2. Drivers of Mail Demand, E-Substitution, and Forecasting 
2.1 Introduction 
The demand for mail is facing a great challenge. In recent years, substitutes such 
as e-mail and SMS (Short Message Service) have become a cheap, fast and convenient 
alternative. In the near future, new broadband-based services, the breakthrough of 
digital signatures, fully Web-based payment systems, and contracting solutions will 
further affect the mailing industry. In Switzerland, total addressed mail peaked in the 
last quarter of 2000, as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Since then, mail volumes have 
been declining. Yet it is not clear whether e-substitution has been the underlying cause 
or whether this was due to some other factor such as the economic slowdown in 
Switzerland between 2001 and 2003.  
Figure 1: Historical development of addressed mail items in Switzerland 
 
Source: Swiss Post  
 
 
It is likely that e-substitution has the potential to change the long run trends of 
mail demand. In the past, in many countries, gross domestic product (GDP) could 
explain a large amount of the variation in mail demand. More recently, countries like 
the US, Finland19, Sweden and the Netherlands reported that GDP is a less accurate 
predictor of first class mail streams. Nader (2004) concludes in his study of mail trends 
                                                     
19 See Heikki (1997). 
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that “GDP and, more generally, economic activity is no longer as strong a determinant 
of mail volume as in the past.”  
Figure 2: Quarterly mail demand (seasonally adjusted) 
 
 
 
A “quick and dirt” regression with historical mail drivers underpins Nader’s 
conclusion also for the Swiss case. Figure 3 presents the residuals of a static OLS 
regression of Swiss mail volumes with only income (GDP) and price as explanatory 
variables.20 The test statistics indicate the existence of an omitted variable. 
Figure 3: Residuals of static OLS regression, R2=97%, DW=0.57 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
20 The regression is not spurious, as the three I(1) variables are cointegrated. 
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Note the autocorrelation at the end of the estimation period. The graph reveals a 
negative trend for the residuals after 1998. In other words, the model increasingly 
overestimates total traffic – a sign of e-substitution? 
To get better insights about the e-substitution case in Switzerland we first look to 
the past. Using econometric modeling techniques, we analyze historical mail volume 
movements to identify trends and trend-breaks. Many authors have conducted such 
econometric studies previously. A brief summary can be found in Cazals et al. (2003) or 
Harding (2004). We use time-series of aggregate mail data and apply a vector error 
correction model similar to the ones of Nankervis et al. (1995, 1999, 2002) and Florens et 
al. (2002). Other studies on aggregate data include Nikali (1997, 1998) and Pimenta et. al 
(1999). 
We base our analysis on Trinkner and Grossmann (2006) and proceed as follows: 
In Section 2.2, we introduce the data. Section 2.3 deals with possible revelations of e-
substitution in time series analysis. Section 2.4 presents the applied error correction 
models including estimation results. Section 2.5 deals with forecasting. We summarize 
and conclude in Section 2.6. 
2.2 Data 
Probably all postal services assume that the various mail streams are affected in 
different ways by e-substitution. However, to analyze possible trend-breaks, we need 
long time series on mail demand. Unfortunately, such an extensive time series does not 
exist on individual mail streams in Switzerland. After Swiss Post introduced fast and 
slow mail in 1991, no distinction between mass mail and single-piece mail has been 
reported until 1996. Therefore, we need to analyze aggregated mail volumes in order to 
get a sufficiently long time series. Aggregated mail, hereafter referred to as “total 
traffic,” includes first and second-class mail, but not unaddressed and registered mail.   
We analyzed quarterly data from 1980Q1 to 2004Q4. The main characteristics are 
summarized in Table 1. The last column contains the order of integration, according to 
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the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root procedure.21 Later, the order of integration will 
play an important role in setting up an error correction model. Traffic, GDP and all price 
indices are I(1). Thus, the series are nonstationary, whereas their first differences ΔXt = 
Xt – Xt-1 are stationary. All the proxies for e-substitution are either I(0) or I(2).22  
In the quarterly data set, the average growth in total traffic Q was about 1.7% per 
year. The growth rate between 1980 and 1990 was 4.1%, substantially larger than in the 
following decade (+1.4%). From 2000 on, the growth rate was negative (-0.9% per year). 
For real and nominal GDP, we observe a similar trend-break in the early 1990s, when 
Switzerland entered a recession followed by a period of low growth. GDP can be 
interpreted either as income or as economic activity reflecting a need for printed 
communication. The ‘mail price index’, P, reflects the price of a constant basket of 
various mail items of total traffic. The CPI (consumer price index) is issued by the Swiss 
National Bank. We use it to compute real measures and to account for inflation when 
regressing in nominal terms.  
The Swiss ministry for telecommunications has computed the telecommunication 
price index since 1993. We will call it the ‘price of the substitute’ (PS). It is a mixed index 
of telecommunications products including broadband Internet access prices. The series 
PS peaks in 1995 and is followed by a steady decline until 2000. Possible reasons for the 
decline are the various technological innovations and/or market liberalization. 
Important to us, the index reflects that substitutes, such as the Internet, e-mail, and SMS, 
became cheaper over time. However, properties of e-substitution other than price are 
hardly captured by PS. Table 1 does not list any variable for quality of service. We do 
not expect this variable to be a crucial point for our study because quality was never an 
issue in Switzerland. 
                                                     
21 Discussion of the theory underlying unit roots, cointegration, and tests for them, can be 
found in Florens (2002) or Hamilton (1994).  
22 Similar to those in Nankervis et al. (2002), the results of the unit root test for the e-proxies 
should be treated with caution. Some of the series start late in the data set, and some are 
interpolated with only a few observations.  
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Table 1: Overview of quarterly data set 
Time series  
(in brackets shortcuts) 
Data source Average 
growth 
rate p.y. 
Period of original 
data 
Order of 
integration  
     
Traffic and GDP     
Total Traffic (Q) Swiss Post 1.7 1980Q1 – 2004Q4 I(1) 
GDP nominal SNB 3.9 1980Q1 – 2004Q4 I(1) 
GDP real (GDP) SNB 1.4 1980Q1 – 2004Q4 I(1) 
     
Price indexes     
Mail price index real (P) Swiss Post 1.3*** 1980Q1 – 2004Q4 I(1) 
Substitutes price index (PS) BACOM 0.0 1993M5 – 2004M12 I(1) 
Consumer price index (CPI) SNB 2.5 1980Q1 – 2004Q4 I(1)/I(2)* 
     
Substitution proxies     
% Active e-bankers (eBank) Swiss Post  1998m9 – 2004m12 I(0) 
% Internet users (eUse) BFS  1994 – 2004 I(2) 
% Internet buyers** (eBuy) BFS  2000 – 2004 I(0) 
% Broadband access** (eBb) BFS  1999 – 2004 I(0) 
% Overall e-index (eIndex) Calculated  (artificial) I(2) 
% Mobile users (mUse) BACOM  1991 – 2004 I(2) 
     
Dummies and other     
dAB Reflects the introduction of A- and B Post in 1991  
nDays Deviation of number of labor days from their mean  
*   I(2) due to Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, I(1) with Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. 
**  These series have been extrapolated with just a few datapoints. 
***  The increase in real prices was mainly due to the introduction of first class mail and the 
 abolishment of cross-subsidies from telecommunications products.  
 
We did not include the substitute’s price PS in the introductory regression. A 
modified static regression of the kind 
)ln()ln()ln()ln( 3210 PSPGDPQ ββββ +++=   ( 1 ) 
reveals residuals similar to the ones in Figure 3. The main difference is that the 
negative trend of the residuals starts in 2000 instead of 1998. We treat this as an 
indication that the PS may not sufficiently reflect the various product innovations and 
increasing positive network externalities of all kinds of e-substitutes. As e-substitution 
cannot be measured directly, we use a set of proxy variables. Loosely speaking, a proxy 
is a series that is somehow related to an unavailable explanatory variable for which we 
would like to control (in our case for e-substitution). 
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Table 1 lists the proxies used in our analysis. ‘Active E-Bankers’ (eBank) contains 
the fraction of customers who actively use Swiss Post’s E-Banking platform 
“Yellownet”.23 The data is available on a monthly basis. It is by far the most accurate 
measured proxy variable because the others are available on a semiannual basis at best, 
creating a need for extrapolation. Interestingly, eBank exhibits a constant linear trend in 
contrast to the other e-series, which are S-shaped (e.g., the cumulative normal 
distribution). The only semiannual series is the fraction of active Internet users in 
Switzerland (eUse). ‘Internet Buyers’ (eBuy) contains the percentage of the Swiss 
population that has used the Internet to buy goods. The data was collected on a yearly 
basis. The series start in 2000 with a high initial value of 23%. Because the available 
values have been close to the ones of eUse, we adjusted the series accordingly. The 
series eBb measures the percentage of the population with a broadband connection to 
access e-substitutes. Finally, the overall Index (eIndex) was constructed as the sum of the 
preceding series. The last variable mUse contains the fraction of the population with a 
mobile telephone. The proxy may reflect the substitution of mail through SMS. 
2.3 E-Substitution in time series analysis 
E-substitution can reveal itself in various ways when performing time series 
analysis. A first form we encountered in Figure 3 where the plot revealed a negative 
trend for the residuals at the end of the estimation period. E-substitution is a 
straightforward explanation for this negative trend, as the e-proxies are highly 
significant when regressed against the residuals. A second and yet related indication for 
e-substitution could be that we cannot find a robust model over the whole time horizon 
without using any proxy for e-substitution.  
If a model is estimated in natural logarithms, demand exhibits constant price 
elasticity. In equation (1), it equals parameter β2 and is independent of Q and time. 
However, despite the legal monopoly of Swiss Post in the letter market, competition 
between physical mail and various electronic forms of written communication, such as 
e-mail, has evolved. In other words, one could expect increasing price elasticity and 
                                                     
23 http://www.postfinance.ch 
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decreasing cross-price elasticity of mail demand over time. Therefore, a third way to 
detect e-substitution may be the estimation of model (1) over various time horizons. If 
price elasticity is consistently larger for samples closer to 2004, this may be a sign of e-
substitution. Figure 4 shows the recursive estimates of equation (1) when the parameter 
for GDP (β1) is restricted to 0.7 for all sample periods. The dotted lines represent +/- 2 
standard errors24. ‘Recursive estimates’ is a procedure, in which the same equation is re-
estimated for increasingly larger samples. For example, the first dot represents the 
estimate with a sample period from 1980Q1 to 1986Q1, whereas the last estimate has a 
sample period from 1980Q1 to 2004Q4. When moving to the right on the curves, the 
confidence bounds converge closer to the point estimates, because more observations 
are included in the respective estimation sample.  
Figure 4: Recursive estimates yield increasing price elasticity 
 
 
 
The depicted trends are in line with economic theory. With increasing competition 
between letters and the substitutes, prices become more important; customers get more 
price sensitive (price elasticity grows from -0.1 to about -0.2) and cross-price elasticity 
becomes significantly different from zero after 2002.  
However, one of our objectives in this study is to forecast mail volumes in the near 
future. To do so, we need to find a robust model. This implies that it is not sufficient just 
to know that price elasticity may further increase over time.  
                                                     
24 A coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level if zero is 
outside the boundary. 
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2.4 Long run models for Swiss mail demand 
To forecast future mail demand it would be useful to know that the relation 
between mail demand, real GDP, and various other factors, such as price, availability, 
and quality of mail and its substitutes is stable. In the previous section we saw that all of 
the important variables are nonstationary I(1) series. According to econometric theory, a 
long-run equilibrium relationship may exist for nonstationary series if they are 
cointegrated, i.e., that a stationary linear combination of the variables is I(0). Under such 
conditions, a so-called (vector) error correction model (VEC) gives efficient estimates. In 
a VEC, the cointegrated series enter in levels.25 The name stems from the underlying 
error correction mechanism shifting the equilibrium variables back to their long-run 
equilibrium.   
Table 2: Unrestricted cointegration rank test 
 Traditional model Substitution  
model 1 
Substitution  
model 2 
    
Endogenous variables Q, GDP, P, PS in 
natural logarithms 
Q, GDP, P, PS in 
natural logarithms 
Q, GDP, P, PS in 
natural logarithms 
    
Exogenous variables dAB dAB, iBank dAB, iUse 
    
Cointegration 
specification 
VAR and EC with 
constant, no trend 
VAR and EC with 
constant, no trend 
VAR and EC with 
constant, no trend 
    
Lags of VEC 4 4 4 
    
Johansen Cointegration test 
Null hypothesis H0  Trace Max E-V Trace Max E-V Trace Max E-V 
0 cointegration relation  65.36*  27.58*  56.74*  38.43*  57.56*  36.27* 
1 cointegration relation  21.12  21.13  18.30  10.63  21.28  16.01 
2 cointegration relation  1.604  14.26  7.67  7.28  5.26  4.73 
    
 *Denotes 1 cointegrating relationship at 95% confidence level 
 
We will estimate three models. The ‘traditional model’ does not include any of the 
e-proxies, whereas the two ‘substitution models’ do. This is the only distinction between 
                                                     
25 If cointegration was not found, a model in first differences would have to be specified to 
avoid spurious regression. 
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the models. We specify for all models the same long-run dynamics such that mail 
demand, real GDP, and prices of mail and its substitutes represent a long-run 
equilibrium relationship. The Johansen Cointegration test in Table 2 indicates one 
cointegrating relation for all three models. If the test is performed for the four 
endogenous series alone, it reveals one cointegrating relation as well. We chose four 
lags, L, to include one year with our quarterly data.  
The functional form of the VEC that corresponds to Table 2 is, for Q, 
( ) .
)1(
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We find the cointegrating relationship in the error correction term. If it equals 0 at 
some time t, we have been exactly in the long-run equilibrium in the previous period t-1 
(i.e., the error term εt-1 was 0). If the error correction term is nonzero, it will influence the 
latest prediction according to the speed of adjustment α.  
The only formal distinction between the three models lies in the choice of eproxyt. 
In the traditional model, the term is not included at all. In the substitution models, the 
choice for eproxy will be eBank in Model 1, and eUse in Model 2.  
Table 3 lists the results obtained from Johansen’s two-step procedure. First, the 
long-run equation (the error correction term in (2)) is estimated. Thereby, the parameter 
of q is normalized to one. In a second step, the remaining parameters in equation (2) are 
computed.26 
 
 
                                                     
26 We used Eviews for our computations in which the procedure is implemented.  
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Table 3: Estimation results (Dependent variable: overall mail volume) 
Adj. sample size:  
1982Q2 to 2004Q4 
Traditional model E-substitution  
model 1 
E-substitution  
model 2 
    
Long run equilibrium equation 
gdp (real) 1.09 [8.14] 1.10 [9.09] 1.12 [9.58] 
p (real) -0.27 [-4.12] -0.27 [-4.52] -0.22 [-3.53] 
Ps 0.17 [4.49] 0.05 [0.60] -0.07 [-0.57] 
Constant (β0) 1.49 1.33 1.29 
    
Short run equation 
Α 0.19 [3.98] 0.13 [2.46] 0.12 [2.03] 
    
dAB 0.00 [0.25] -0.01 [-0.64] -0.01 [-0.63] 
eBank  -0.21 [-4.80]  
eUse   -0.09 [-4.42] 
    
Δq    t-1 -0.69 [-6.38] -0.78 [-7.08] -0.78 [-6.89] 
 t-2 -0.44 [-3.4] -0.56 [-4.18] -0.56 [-4.07] 
 t-3 -0.39 [-3.19] -0.50 [-4.00] -0.49 [-3.88] 
 t-4 -0.25 [-2.37] -0.33 [-3.1] -0.32 [-2.97] 
Δgdp t-1 0.57 [2.07] 0.51 [1.91] 0.50 [1.84] 
 t-2 0.19 [0.65] 0.19 [0.67] 0.16 [0.57] 
 t-3 -0.02 [-0.06] -0.05 [-0.20] -0.06 [-0.23] 
 t-4 0.11 [0.43] 0.11 [0.43] 0.10 [0.40] 
Δp  t-1 -0.09 [-2.11] -0.09 [-2.27] -0.10 [-2.50] 
 t-2 -0.07 [-1.61] -0.08 [-1.92] -0.09 [-2.09] 
 t-3 -0.05 [-1.05] -0.05 [-1.3] -0.06 [-1.51] 
 t-4 -0.08 [-1.71] -0.10 [-2.23] -0.10 [-2.29] 
Δps    t-1 0.20 [2.21] 0.23 [2.65] 0.22 [2.51] 
 t-2 -0.23 [-2.41] -0.21 [-2.25] -0.22 [-2.39] 
 t-3 -0.09 [-0.86] -0.08 [-0.81] -0.08 [-0.87] 
 t-4 -0.12 [-1.25] -0.11 [-1.23] -0.12 [-1.28] 
    
Constant (γ0) 0.01 [1.23] 0.02 [2.93] 0.02 [3.99] 
    
Test statistics    
R2  57% 61% 60% 
Adjusted R2 46% 51% 49% 
Log likelihood 271.24 275.96 274.87 
F-statistic 5.26 5.86 5.63 
    
The values in parentheses are the t-values. According to Wald tests all lags are significant and all 
endogenous variables satisfy Granger causation tests. Other e-proxies do not improve the model 
compared with eBank and eUse. We prefer them because of better data quality. 
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The goodness of fit (R2) of the three models is acceptable.27 A graphical fit is shown 
in Section 2.5. In general, the coefficients have signs as expected and values that are in 
line with previous studies. The long-run price elasticity is highly significant and ranges 
between -0.22 and -0.27. This tells us that a 10% increase in price will reduce total traffic 
between 2.2 and 2.7% in the long run. However, the speed of adjustment α seems to be 
quite small and it is not clear, a priori, what the adjustment dynamics are. Figure 5 
depicts the effect of a hypothetical 10% price increase at the beginning of year 2000 
according to substitution model 1. The loss in volume converges to the prediction of the 
long-run price elasticity (as shown by the dotted line) after about three years. One 
would expect demand to be more price sensitive.28  
Figure 5: Demand shock after a 10% price increase 
 
 
The main coefficient difference between the models is the long run elasticity of the 
substitutes’ price PS; whereas the short run impact of a change in the PS is about the 
                                                     
27 If the same model is estimated with data that was not seasonally adjusted, R2 and adjusted 
R2 are between 97% and 99% when seasonal dummies are included. The large difference to 
the values given in Table 3 stems from the predictive power of the seasonal dummies. 
Without the seasonal adjustment, most of the variation in mail demand is caused by 
seasonality, which is well explained by quarterly dummies. To illustrate, a static 
regression for Q with only a constant, a trend, and quarterly dummies yields an adjusted 
R2 of 84%. 
28 See Cazals et al. (2002) for a theoretical treatment, of why time series models exhibit often 
lower elasticities than cross-section models. 
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same among the three models, the long run effect is significant only in the traditional 
model. At the same time, the two e-proxies in the substitution models are highly 
significant. It appears that once eBank and eUse are included in the model, they provide 
a better approximation than the substitutes’ price index does. An interpretation may be 
that the choice between writing a letter and sending an e-mail or SMS is dominated by 
other product properties than price. 
2.5 Forecasting future mail demand 
How do the three models predict future mail demand? One general possibility for 
forecasting with a time series model is to solve the previously estimated static model 
with one’s own or a third party’s expectations about future realizations of the 
independent variables for every t in the forecasting horizon t+1…T. This approach leads 
to two kinds of forecasting error: (1) erroneous expectations, e.g., the assumption of 
future GDP growth proves to be under- or overestimated; and (2) specification error of 
the previously estimated model. A second general possibility for time-series forecasting 
is to estimate a dynamic model in lags, so no expectations about future values of 
explanatory variables are necessary, at least for the one-step-ahead forecast at t+1. Either 
way, the forecasting interval for a given confidence level increases with the length of the 
forecasting horizon. 
In order to predict with our vector error correction model we need to mix the two 
ways to some extent. Note that equation (2) does not include any values of the 
endogenous variables at time t. Thus, for predicting mail demand for the next period 
t+1, the model does not build on GDPt+1: it only uses GDPt. This property is useful for 
performing one-step-ahead forecasts because the model needs observed values of the 
endogenous variables only. Even multi-step-ahead forecasts are possible without 
making any forecast of the explanatory variables. To explain this, we return to equation 
(2). The complete VEC specification includes analogous equations for the other 
endogenous variables GDP, P, and PS. Thus, to perform a forecast for time t+2, we can 
use the predicted endogenous values from t+1. However, we still need to make our own 
expectations of the two exogenous e-proxies. 
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Both kinds of forecasts were carried out. The first kind is done by treating all 
endogenous variables, other than total traffic, as exogenous29. Thus, we need to predict 
all the explanatory variables manually. For nominal GDP, we assume 1.8% growth per 
year. Further, we assume nominal price stability of postal prices, and we extrapolate 
CPI, PS, eBank and eUse according to their past trends.30 We solve the model 
stochastically to obtain confidence bounds. The results for the forecasting period from 
1990Q1 to 2007Q4 are shown in Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 on the left-hand side. 
The dotted line is the one-step confidence bound. From 1990Q1 to 2004Q4, the predicted 
values represent the model fit during the estimation period. The observations from 
2005Q1 to 2007Q4 show the forecasts for the out-of-sample period. Observation 2005Q1 
deserves special attention. It is the most recent realization of total traffic and enables an 
indicative reality check of the estimated models. 
The right-hand side of Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 show the results from the 
endogenous stochastic solution of the model, i.e., only eBank and eUse are determined 
outside the model. The forecasting period starts in 2005Q1. The dotted lines represent 
the multi-step confidence bounds. Note that the solution does not account for coefficient 
uncertainty in linked equations.  
The traditional model (TM) gives by far the most optimistic scenario for future 
mail demand. According to the model’s results shown in Figure 6, mail demand has 
now entered a period of low but positive growth. The second graph (i.e. endogenous 
predictions) reveals that the model fit for the realization 2005Q1 is not as good as those 
obtained from the substitution models. On the other hand, the predictions for the other 
endogenous variables are by far the most realistic ones (not shown here). 
 
 
                                                     
29 This means that ΔQt+2  is computed with our own expectation of GDPt+1  instead of the VEC 
prediction 1ˆ +tPDG . 
30 Taken all together, this is quite a large set of assumptions. 
– 24 –  
Figure 6: Exogenous (left) and endogenous (right) predictions TM 
 
 
 
The most pessimistic outlook is given by substitution model 1 (SM1). According to 
the model, the decline in aggregate mail demand will continue at an accelerated speed 
(Figure 7). The one-step-ahead forecast for 2005Q4 is quite accurate. However, the 
predicted dynamics for the other exogenous variables are quite unrealistic. According to 
the endogenous solution, Switzerland will enter a heavy recession soon. 
Figure 7: Exogenous (left) and endogenous (right) predictions SM1 
 
 
Substitution model 2 (SM2) lies somewhere in between the other two. The 
exogenous solution states that the decline is slowing down (Figure 8). The fit at 2005Q1 
is almost perfect. In the endogenous model, the forecasts for GDP are again very 
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pessimistic. This can be seen indirectly by comparing the two graphs; the decline is 
more severe in the endogenous calculations, because the (endogenous) forecast for GDP 
is much lower than our expectation of 1.8% growth.  
Figure 8: Exogenous (left) and endogenous (right) predictions SM2  
 
 
Comparing fit and forecast of the three models, each one has its own pros and 
cons. The traditional model exhibits the poorest fit, especially towards the end of the 
estimation period. As a direct consequence, the forecast performance at 2005Q1 is poor. 
Nevertheless, the endogenous predictions of GDP and prices seem to be the most 
realistic ones. Both substitution models predict an unrealistic negative development of 
future GDP. Still, they provide a better fit and a better one-step-ahead forecast.  
2.6 Conclusions 
E-substitution is one of the most crucial issues in the postal industry. Most postal 
services heavily depend on their core business of delivering physical mail – once the 
only form of advanced long distance communication. The primary threat of e-
substitution lies in the historical business model of most postal services. Over time, 
larger mail volumes increased economies of scale31 and enabled the postal services to 
                                                     
31 For economics on the cost structure of postal services see among others NERA (2004). For a 
detailed discussion on economies of scale and density in mail delivery see Chapter 3. 
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keep postal rates low despite increasing labor costs and better service provision32. A 
comparison between the development of real wages and real postal rates illustrates the 
historical postal business model. Whereas real wages grew exponentially, Swiss Post’s 
real rates are today even lower than in the 1920s. In short, e-substitution questions the 
stability of this business model. Moreover, the ‘political universal service model’ builds 
on growth of mail demand. The remarkable growth over the past 100 years enabled 
politicians to impose uniform rates and demanding service obligations on the postal 
services, i.e., nationwide coverage of home delivery, without undermining the financial 
viability of the postal service. However, e-substitution also brings into question the 
stability of the political universal service model. 
The intent of our research was to forecast future mail volumes and thereby to 
assess future e-substitution. We estimated three vector error correction models with 
quarterly data of Swiss aggregate mail demand. We found strong evidence that e-
substitution has happened in the past few years. Moreover, two of the three models 
indicate that e-substitution will continue to undermine mail demand in the short and 
medium term. For the long term, we dare no prediction; we conclude that it is nearly 
impossible to make long-run forecasts with the applied techniques, because there is no 
unique proxy for e-substitution. Every such proxy yields another result, and combining 
or merging different proxies brings the same set of problems (or makes it even 
impossible to find a cointegrated long-run relationship). In addition, we do not know 
what kind of new substitutes will emerge in the near future and whether these 
substitutes are represented in our current proxies.33  
Despite these limitations for long forecasting horizons, the short-run predictions 
seem to be accurate. Here we see the strengths of vector error correction models. They 
are powerful tools for forecasting the near future because they combine explanatory 
                                                     
32 Over time, most postal services significantly increased their services, e.g. P.O. box delivery 
was complemented with home delivery. An interesting case on the development of 
Universal Service in the United States provides Campbell (2004). 
33 Cross-sectional econometric methods such as discrete choice analysis could resolve the 
problem. Nonetheless, we believe that the design of a survey with choices over 
hypothetical e-products would cause similar problems as e-proxies do here. 
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variables in levels, differences, and lags and still provide an economic interpretation of 
the results. 
Inevitably, we do not know how severely e-substitution will affect mail volumes 
in the future. However, our model predictions are not optimistic, ranging from 
accelerated decline to slow growth. We therefore recommend for politicians and 
regulators to find universal service policies that do not increase the universal service 
provider’s fixed costs.  
A key issue going forward for postal services will be not to rely solely on their 
historical business models and to prepare for the worst. In fact, many operators have 
initiated projects to respond to this uncertainty, e.g. with diversification into new 
product lines and with programs to make costs more responsive to (potentially 
declining) demand conditions (i.e. reduce fraction of fixed costs). 
Figure 9: E-Substitution as a loss of market share in platform competition 
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In the same time, it is important to understand e-substitution as a result of 
competition of letters against other platforms of communications (transactional 
mail/direct mail against E-Mail, SMS, internet platforms, etc), and other means for 
advertising (direct mail against TV, newspapers, etc). Figure 9 illustrates this “indirect 
competition” or “platform competition” in contrast to “direct competition”, where 
postal operators directly compete against themselves for the delivery of physical letters. 
Hence, it is crucial that postal services understand e-substitution not just as an inevitable 
matter of fact, but as a competitive outcome of platform competition, where yet the 
“battle for mail” is not lost34. In this light, postal services increasingly and successfully35 
are starting to position mail within the broader communications, internet and 
advertising industry. 
                                                     
34 Figure 4 illustrates this evolving and increasing “indirect” competition: Price elasticities 
increased over time (i.e. more negative), most probably because of emerging substitutes, 
whereas cross-price elasticities got statistically significant, most probably because the 
telecommunications index increasingly included prices of new substitutes such as SMS 
and access to the internet (E-Mail).  
35 Cf. positive effects of USPS’ and Pitney Bowes’ recent campaigns for mail in the US.  
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3. Economies of Scale, Density and Scope in Mail Delivery 
3.1 Introduction 
In the letters market, the postal value chain can be segmented into the four main 
processes collection, sorting, transportation, and delivery as depicted in Figure 10. 
Collection takes many forms. The traditional retail channels are post offices, postal 
partners36, and mail drop boxes. Large customers additionally have the possibility to use 
customized business counters (e.g. located at sorting centers), direct collection by postal 
operators, or electronic delivery of data to specialized letter shops. Sorting is in most 
countries done in two steps. Outbound-sorting involves a first run, where the mail is 
sorted to the first two or three digits of the postal zip code, and inbound-sorting 
typically involves the final sorting on carrier route level. Delivery is done mainly by 
mail carriers who first sequence the mail (“walk sorting”) before physically delivering 
the mail of their routes to mail boxes.  It is important to note that delivery accounts for 
the largest fraction of total cost of postal end-to-end operators. 
Figure 10: The postal value chain 
 
 
 
                                                     
36 E.g. grocery stores offering basic postal services. Main examples are the liberalized postal 
markets of Sweden and New Zealand. For a discussion of the regulatory model of these 
two countries in reference to Switzerland see Jaag and Trinkner (2007). 
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Table 4 depicts that delivery of physical mail accounts for about 50 percent of total 
costs of postal operators. Hence, inefficiencies in mail delivery are of particular 
importance and face increasing management attention. New econometric approaches 
have the potential to serve decision makers in several crucial issues: implementing 
internal benchmarking tools to promote internal competition between decision units, to 
determine the optimal size of delivery units, to assess where mail and parcels services 
should be provided by joint or separate delivery units, and to know how much costs are 
dependent on volumes.   
Table 4: Distribution of total costs 
  Overhead Collection Sorting Transport  Delivery 
Letters 16% 12% 15% 7% 50% 
Parcels 13% 10% 17% 21% 39% 
 Source: NERA (2004) 
 
The empirical part of the chapter assesses the three latter issues using an 
econometric approach. We analyze the cost structure of a sample of mail delivery units 
from Swiss Post. In 2004, Swiss Post organized these units in four regions. In every 
region, various mail delivery centers lead a small number of local delivery units. These 
delivery units are the main starting point for a total of 10,000 mail carriers that deliver 
letters six times a week to almost every household in Switzerland. 
We estimate a quadratic cost function employing a cross-section data set from 
Swiss Post from 2004 with information on 327 postal units, most of them delivering 
parcels as well. The quadratic specification enables us to estimate measures of 
economies of scale and density as well as economies of scope between mail and parcels. 
The empirical results of this study could be used by postal operators in particular 
for strategic planning, to decide whether letters and parcels should be delivered joint or 
separate, and to define the optimal size of the service area for each delivery unit. The 
results are further useful for policy makers to assess the impact of the letter market 
liberalization on the industry’s cost structure.  
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The chapter is organized as follows and id based to a large extent on Farsi, 
Filippini and Trinkner (2006). Section 3.2 outlines the main contribution of our research 
relative to the most important papers in the field. Section 3.3 presents the model 
specifications. Section 3.4 introduces the data, and Section 3.5 provides the estimation 
results. We compute the measures for economies of scale, density and scope in Section 
3.6 and conclude in Section 3.7. We find empirical evidence for economies of scale, 
density, and scope. Section 3.8 discusses some important corollaries in the context of the 
theory of contestable markets and natural monopolies. 
3.2 Background 
In the literature, there are few published studies on the economies of scale and 
scope of postal services.37 The most recent studies relevant for our study are those by 
Wada, et. al. (1997), Gazzei et al. (2002), Mizutani and Uranishi (2003), Cazals et al. 
(2005) and Filippini and Zola (2005).  
Wada, Tsunoda and Nemoto (1997) estimate a multiproduct total cost function of 
the Japanese mail service by treating the delivery of letter mail and that of parcels as two 
independent outputs. In their study, they consider panel data covering 12 regional 
postal offices collected over a 15-year period from 1980 to 1994. Using a translog cost 
function they find evidence for the existence of overall economies of scale. Furthermore, 
the estimation of a generalized translog function highlights significant product-specific 
economies of scale for letter mail, but not for parcels. 
Gazzei et al. (2002) apply a multiproduct cost function to analyze a database 
consisting of a cross-section of 9168 French post offices operating over the year 1999. The 
results of their empirical analysis, based on a log-log cost function, suggest the presence 
of economies of scale. In spite the fact that these authors estimate a multiproduct cost 
function, no estimation on the economies of scope is provided. The reason is that the 
log-log functional form does not allow the computation of the economies of scope. 
                                                     
37  See NERA (2004) for an overview of the empirical literature in this field. 
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Mizutani and Uranishi (2003) perform an econometric analysis of economies of 
scale using a single-output cost model, considering the public company (Post Office) 
and five other private carriers operating in Japan. Through the econometric estimation 
of a translog total cost function using a pooled data set over the period 1972-1998, they 
find no evidence for the hypothesis of the presence of economies of scale for this 
industry. 
Cazals, Florens and Soteri (2005) assume a log-linear specification to analyze panel 
data of Royal Mail’s delivery units. By estimating the cost elasticity for various sub-
samples, they highlight the importance of the unobserved heterogeneity in the 
estimation of scale economies especially in the rural areas. They also point out that the 
economies of scale in delivery mainly originate from the key variable traffic per delivery 
point. The scope economies have not been estimated.  
The paper by Filippini and Zola (2005) investigates scale and cost efficiency of a 
sample of Swiss postal offices. The paper considers estimation of a log-log multiproduct 
cost function employing a cross-section data set on small local post offices. The 
empirical evidence indicates the existence of economies of scale. Further, the outcome of 
this analysis shows that approximately 50% of the postal offices operate close to the 
regional standard for efficiency. Again, the authors do not provide empirical evidence 
on economies of scope because of the use of the log-log functional form. 
Most of these studies have used a log-log or a translog functional form.38 These 
functional forms have a drawback compared to other forms such as quadratic in that 
they do not provide a straightforward estimation method for economies of scope.39 
                                                     
38  See for example  Cazals et al. (2001), Mizutani and Uranishi (2003), Wada et al. (1997) and 
Gori et al. (2005). 
39  A major shortcoming of the translog functional form is that, since the natural logarithm of 
zero is not defined, it can only be used for multiproduct producers that supply positive 
quantities in all outputs. This problem can be solved by incorporating a Box-Cox 
transformation of the output variables. However, the translog functional form 
incorporating this transformation is non-linear in its parameters and therefore harder to 
estimate. 
– 33 –  
The concept of scope economies (Baumol et al., 1982) can only be estimated if the 
cost function allows a zero value for outputs, which is not the case in any logarithmic 
form. There are few studies that have tried an estimation of scope economies in line with 
the classical definition. One exception is Wada et al. (1997), who have used a generalized 
translog form with Box-Cox transformation to overcome the problem of zero output. In 
this chapter we are interested to analyze both economies of scale and economies of 
scope. For this reason, we follow Baumol et al. (1982) and use a quadratic functional 
form in which the scope economies can be directly identified.  
The three major differences of this study in comparison to the studies discussed 
before are (1) the utilization of a quadratic functional form, (2) the use of an econometric 
procedure that takes into account the heteroscedasticity problem typical for a sample 
that contains small as well very large production units, and (3) the estimation of a cost 
function for the delivery units of Swiss Post. 
3.3 Model specification an econometric methods 
The adopted model is based on a quadratic cost function with two outputs 
namely, mail (Y1) and parcel (Y2) and two input factors: labor and capital. The outputs 
are calculated as an adjusted sum of the number of letters (parcels) delivered. Letters, 
for which the postal carrier needs more time for delivery, are weighted more than 
ordinary letters. Labor price (PL) is measured as the average annual salary of a full-time-
equivalent employee engaged in delivery. Capital price (PK) is measured as the ratio of 
the non-labor expenses to a measure of physical capital. This latter measure is taken is a 
weighted sum of the number of vehicles owned by the postal unit. This measure has its 
clear limitations, but is the only one available.  
In addition to outputs and input prices, two output characteristics have been 
included: These variables include the number of delivery points in the service area 
(denoted by H) and the number of affiliated local delivery units (B), which is a positive 
value for the regional delivery centers that are usually linked to several local delivery 
units. It is set to zero for local units. In addition, three dummies (R1, R2, R3) representing 
the north, east, west and southern regions are included. 
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The resulting specification of the cost function can be written as:  
  ( 3 ), 
where C represents total cost and the explanatory variables are defined as above.   
A quadratic functional form is used. As explained in the previous Section, this 
functional form provides a readily applicable expression for the economies of scope. 
Moreover, because of the presence of zero parcel output in some of the delivery units 
(about 12.5% of the sample) logarithmic forms like Cobb-Douglas and translog would 
require additional adjustments. The cost function can be written as: 
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with 1, 2, ... , i N= , where subscript i denotes the delivery unit; N is the number of 
delivery units; and εi  is the error term. All the explanatory variables are normalized, 
namely, they are replaced by their deviations from their respective median values. Four 
econometric specifications have been considered: The first model (Model I) is an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model in which the error term (εi) is assumed to be 
identically and independently distributed across the delivery units. 
In the remaining models, the error term has a more general structure that allows 
for heteroscedasticity. Three cases have been considered: Model II is a Weighted Least 
Squares (WLS) in which variances are assumed to be proportional to the square of the 
mean of the dependent variable as predicted by the OLS model (denoted by OLSiC ). 
Model III is also a WLS model but with variances proportional to the square of the total 
deliveries (Y) including mail and parcel outputs. Finally Model IV is a Multiplicative 
Heteroscedastic (MH) regression model in which the variance is assumed to be an 
exponential function of total deliveries (Y) and a binary indicator (D) distinguishing the 
delivery centers from the regional delivery units. The latter model has been estimated 
by the full-information maximum likelihood method, which requires the assumption of 
normality. The specification of variances in the adopted models can be summarized as:  
 
1 2 1 2 3( , , , , , , , , )L KC C Y Y P P H B R R R=
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3.4 Data 
The data consist of a cross section of 328 mail delivery units operated by Swiss 
Post’s letter section. These units are organized as 241 local delivery units and 87 regional 
centers. The operation of each local unit is monitored by the corresponding regional 
delivery center. All the regional centers have also local delivery tasks. The number of 
delivery units attached to a regional delivery center varies considerably and averages 
about three units per center. The final regression sample consists of 327 observations 
including 86 regional centers40 and 241 local delivery units. The various units cover a 
wide range of output and costs, varying from 1.3 to over 50 million deliveries.  
Figure 11: Swiss Post’s organization of mail delivery as of 2004 
 
                                                     
40  We had to exclude one of the regional delivery centers from the sample because of missing 
values for costs.  
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Most of the studied mail delivery units also provide parcels deliveries in rural 
areas. In about 16 percent of the delivery units the number of delivered parcels is very 
small (less than 100 for the entire one-year period). The number of delivery points varies 
quite considerably across the delivery units.   
As the operation of delivery centers includes the additional responsibility of 
monitoring the local units within their regional zone, one could argue that these centers 
should be analyzed separately. However, our preliminary regressions using the OLS 
specification in (4), and with the appropriate interaction terms indicated that the 
differences between the coefficients across local units and regional centers are not 
statistically significant. Therefore, we consider both categories in a single sample. It 
should be noted that although the regional centers are on average significantly larger 
than the local units, this is not a general rule. The t-tests show that while both mail 
output and number of delivery points are on average significantly larger in regional 
offices, the parcel output volume is not significantly different across the two categories.  
3.5 Estimation results  
The models explained in Equations (4) and (5) have been estimated for the sample. 
The regression results are listed in Farsi et al. (2006). The first observation is that most of 
the explanatory variables show statistically significant effects with the expected signs. 
An exception is the input factor prices. The coefficients of both labor and capital prices 
are insignificant, suggesting that cost differences across companies are not driven by 
differences in input prices.41  
Secondly, the results of Model I that does not consider the heteroscedasticity are 
significantly different from the other three models. In particular, according to this 
model, the parcel output does not have a significant effect on costs (at 5% significance 
level), whereas unlike other models, the output interaction term (Y1Y2) has a positive 
                                                     
41  This result could be related to the measurement errors incurred in the estimation of prices. 
However, it is not surprising as we consider decision units from the same company.  
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and significant effect on costs. These differences suggest that ignoring heteroscedasticity 
might cause misleading results not only regarding standard errors and significance but 
for the coefficients as well. Another interesting observation is that all region dummies 
are highly significant suggesting that postal networks in different areas depend on 
certain unobserved region-specific characteristics. 
Among the models, starting from OLS model that does not account for 
heteroscedasticity, there is a specific order across the remaining three models. Model II 
accounts for heteroscedasticity through the existing variables in the mode. Model III 
goes one step further in that the variations are adjusted using an additional variable 
(total deliveries). Finally, Model IV defines a structure for heteroscedasticity based on 
two additional variables (total deliveries and regional unit dummy). As the results listed 
in Farsi et al. (2006) indicate, the pattern of variation of the estimated coefficients across 
different models confirms the existence of heteroscedasticity bias. We contend that 
Model IV results should be considered as the best estimates among the presented 
models. According to this model, the output coefficient of mail is on average about 0.19. 
Each customer (delivery point) has a marginal cost of CHF 70 and each additional 
branch has a cost burden of about CHF 100,000 for a regional unit.  
3.6 Economies of scale, density and scope 
The inclusion in the cost function (5) of the number of delivery points allows for 
the distinction of economies of scale (ES), economies of density (ED), and economies of 
scope (ESS). 
In a multiproduct setting, economies of scale are defined as those reductions in ray 
average cost when all outputs and number of delivery points are increased 
proportionally, holding all input prices fixed. E.g., merging two local units would save 
money when ES are positive. Economies of density exist if simultaneously increasing the 
production of all outputs, holding the number of delivery points fixed, lowers ray 
average cost. Thus,  positive ED would mean that Swiss Post’s unit costs would increase 
in case mail demand where to be shrinking (e.g. because of E-Substitution or shrinking 
market shares). Economies of scope are present when there are cost efficiencies to be 
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gained by joint production of multiple outputs. If ESS between mail and parcels are 
locally present, it makes sense to provide the two services with the same carrier.    
Following Baumol et al. (1982) economies of scale, density and scope in a multi-
output setting are respectively defined as: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
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 ( 6 ). 
The estimated values of economies of scale, density and scope are given in Table 5. 
These values have been estimated based on equations (6) for each one of the delivery 
units in the sample. Taking into account the experiences from other countries, the levels 
of the variables should be treated with caution because of the lack of panel data. 
However, the relative altitudes are important. The results indicate that virtually in all 
companies and across all models, the scope economies are positive. Similarly, the 
constant of density economies is higher than 1 in almost all companies suggesting the 
existence of density economies in a large majority of the cases.42 The constants of scale 
economies are also higher than 1 in a small majority of the observations. However, in 
about 20 to 25 percent of the cases, this constant is either less than 1 or very close to 1, 
suggesting that scale economies are not considerable in many cases. 
The results suggest that scope economies are considerable across mail and parcel 
services especially in regions with low mail and parcels volume (negative correlation 
with Y). This supports Swiss Post’s policy to combine the two services in rural areas. 
According to Model IV, combining parcel and mail can save a considerable amount of 
the total costs compared to a case, in which two delivery units operate mail and parcel 
                                                     
42  There is only one unit that according to the OLS model, has negative scope economies and 
diseconomies of density and scope. Model IV predicts diseconomies of density only for 5 
units. 
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separately. The estimated density economies suggest that an increase of mail demand, 
that goes not together with increasing the number of delivery points (extending 
network) reduces average costs per piece of mail and vice versa. On the other hand, the 
estimated scale economies suggest that in many cases, if such an increase involves an 
extension in the network or an increase in the number of customers, the economies will 
not be considerable. However, the results suggest that at least about half of the units 
included in the sample do not fully exploit the potential scale economies. The significant 
negative correlation with the output suggests that the scale economies are lower for 
large delivery units. In other words, the figures indicate that there is some potential for 
Swiss Post in merging some of the smaller delivery units. However, geographical 
reasons may restrict the potential of such a merger program.   
Table 5: Economies of scope, scale and density 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
     
Scale economies: 
1st quantile 0.389 0.346 0.305 0.341 
Median 0.455 0.378 0.334 0.372 
3rd quantile 0.519 0.417 0.377 0.410 
Correlation with Y NS -0.173 NS -0.374 
     
Density economies: 
1st quantile 1.033 1.084 1.057 1.036 
Median 1.109 1.147 1.102 1.112 
3rd quantile 1.207 1.216 1.162 1.187 
Correlation with Y -0.267 -0.463 -0.387 -0.575 
     
Scope economies: 
1st quantile 1.594 1.477 1.401 1.390 
Median 1.794 1.542 1.457 1.477 
3rd quantile 2.021 1.645 1.556 1.587 
Correlation with Y -0.164 -0.389 -0.264 -0.570 
     
NS = not significant;  
Model I: OLS; Model II: WLS with weights being the OLS prediction; Model III: WLS with 
weights being the total deliveries; Model IV: Multiplicative heteroscendastic regression.  
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3.7 Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the cost structure of Swiss Post’s 
delivery units in order to assess economies of scale, economies of density and economies 
of scope. In particular, policy-makers are interested in cost information of this industry 
in order to determine the desirability of competition in the postal delivery sector. 
Moreover, from a company point of view, the management of Swiss Post can be 
interested in having some information on the economies of scale and scope in order to 
define a policy on combining individual operating units.  
A quadratic total cost function was estimated using a cross section of 327 delivery 
units for the year 2004. The empirical results indicate the existence of economies of 
density, economies of scale and economies of scope especially for units with low mail 
volumes.  
The results on economies of scale suggest that a considerable portion of the postal 
delivery units seem to operate at an inappropriately low scale. The service territory area 
of most of these units appear too small to produce at optimal scale. Therefore, if 
geographically feasible, mergers between two small units whose service territories are 
adjacent would improve the scale efficiency of these units.  
The estimated economies of density can help to clarify the efficiency of side-by-
side (“end-to-end”) competition at all points of a given service territory versus 
monopolistic provision of delivery postal services. The finding shows that the cost of 
serving a market of size y over a municipal territory with one delivery unit is lower than 
the cost of serving the same market with n competitive delivery units that install parallel 
facilities everywhere. Therefore, side-by-side competition is less cost-efficient than the 
monopolistic distribution of postal services. Our findings offer some support to the 
policy of monopoly-based postal delivery regulations such as the US model 
“worksharing” (for details the reader is referred to Section 4). In the US, a mandatory 
access-regime is in place, where access to the incumbent’s network is not only possible, 
but also mandatory: It is not allowed to bypass the delivery network of the incumbent 
USPS. It is important to point out that such a system is not possible once end-to-end 
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competition is introduced as it is the case in the UK. These results are in line with 
various market entry models. Section 4 provides more background and an overall 
welfare assessment of various liberalization policies. 
The presence of economies of scope shows that an unbundling of a multi-output 
company into single-output companies leads to higher costs in the market as the 
synergies in the joint (rural) production are no more exploited. This implies that the two 
postal delivery services, mail and parcels should be provided by the same delivery unit 
at least in rural areas. Again, the US system is economically supported: The USPS offers 
access for parcels. This product is utilized mainly for parcels destined to rural areas.  
3.8 Discussion: Mail delivery as a contested natural monopoly 
In Section 3.6 we have estimated economies of scale and scope simultaneously. 
This enables us to draw some conclusions on the question whether delivery of mail 
satisfies the properties of a natural monopoly or not.   
An industry is said to have the property of a natural monopoly if one single firm 
can produce a given output at a lower cost than two ore more firms. More precisely, we 
can speak of a natural monopoly if the cost function for producing a set of outputs is 
subadditive in the relevant range of output vectors. This condition implies that the costs 
of producing a vector of outputs as a whole are less than the costs of producing the 
same output subdivided in any combination of subsets. For a precise definition the 
reader is referred to Baumol (1977).  
In the single-output case, cost function C(y) is subadditive for output y if the 
production of any output combination  y1, …, ym  satisfying ∑
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To illustrate, if it was not possible to distribute letters together with any other 
items such as parcels (that is we are in the single-product case), the presence of 
economies of scale and density would imply decreasing average costs and hence 
subadditivity.  
However, letters are most often distributed together with parcels, unaddressed 
mail, value added services such as registered mail, and others. Baumol (1977) shows that 
in such a multi-product case economies of scale and density are nor a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition. The underlying reasons are economies or diseconomies of scope 
between the various products. Thereby, economies of scope are a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition for subadditivity in the multi-product case. As Baumol, Panzar and 
Willig (1982) point out, even the presence of both economies of scale and scope (as our 
estimations indicate) are not sufficient – for example two products might exhibit 
moderate economies scale and scope in joint production, but each individually very 
high economies of scale. Hence, the subadditivity property implies that a global test for 
any combination of outputs should be conducted.  
In the postal sector there have been some econometric attempts to shed light on 
the natural monopoly property of letter delivery. Bradley and Colvin (1995) and Wada 
et al. (1997) find mixed evidence on cost subadditivity depending on the cost function 
specification in the provision of letter and parcel services. Although we did not apply a 
global test for subadditivity, the simultaneous presence of economies of scale and scope 
(cf. Table 5) together with limited economies of scale in BtoC parcels delivery43 points 
towards a natural monopoly. Similarly, most economists regard letters delivery as a 
(contestable) natural monopoly. Cremer (2000, p. 49) states that “there seems to be a 
widespread consensus that at least one segment of the network, namely distribution is a 
natural monopoly”.  
However, even if mail delivery is a natural monopoly, it is important to note that 
it is to be considered a contestable natural monopoly. Contestability refers to the 
                                                     
43 In BtoC parcels delivery, where delivery points are varying day by day, the fraction of 
fixed costs is much smaller than in BtoC letters delivery, where mail carriers face fixed 
routes times in countries with high mail volumes per capita such as Switzerland. 
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contestable markets theory that goes back on Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) and 
essentially expands economic efficiency properties based on the assumption of perfect 
markets to industries exhibiting subadditive cost structures provided there are no relevant 
sunk costs. In such markets operators do not succeed in preventing entry unless prices 
are set according to marginal costs. If in contrast sunk costs are present, we speak of a 
“monopolistic bottleneck” (see Table 6) which would raise the issue of stable market 
power with a respective justification for access regulation.  
Given the cost characteristics of mail delivery, no relevant sunk costs can be 
identified. Panzar (2002a) for example states that “there is little need to make such large 
sunk investments in the provision of postal and delivery services, since the bulk of 
postal costs are labor costs” and concludes in Panzar (2002b) that “postal markets are 
readily contested”. Among others, Knieps (2002), seco (2005), Vaterlaus et al. (2003, 2007) 
argue that there are no monopolistic bottlenecks in the letters market.  
Table 6: Contestability in dependence of cost characteristics  
Network area With sunk costs Without sunk costs 
Natural monopoly Monopolistic bottlenecks Potential competition 
(Contestable Networks) 
No natural monopoly  Competition among active 
providers 
Competition among active 
providers 
Source: Knieps (2005) 
 
 
Note that the concept of potential competition predicts no market entries for the 
mail market. Yet in practice we observe new entrants in deregulated postal markets 
such as New Zealand or Sweden44. Thus, either the theory of contestable markets fails, 
or postal markets are not to be classified as natural monopolies, or some other reasons 
enable new entrants more competitive cost structures with successful market entries.  
                                                     
44 Cf. Andersson (2006) for an overview. 
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One important element that determines the cost structure of postal incumbents45 is the 
universal service obligation (USO). This constraint is imposed either on the market (i.e. 
public procurement, pay or play rules) or to the historical operator (asymmetric 
designation) with the latter being the only solution applied in practice so far46.   
Thereby, one USO constraint in particular limits the full exploitation of economies 
of scale, density and scope as computed above: The requirement to distribute every 
working day significantly reduces the universal service providers (USP) possibility to 
exploit economies of density compared to new entrants who limit their delivery to once 
or twice per week only. For example, Swiss Post is by law obliged not to fully exploit 
economies of density (at least 5 deliveries per week) which gives leeway for new 
entrants to enter the market for slow mail. Real world examples include Sandd from the 
Netherlands and CityMail from Sweden which both deliver twice a week. Moreover, 
recapitulate from our estimations that economies of scale are limited for large units, i.e. 
entrants can reach better economies of scale than incumbents by distributing in selected 
geographic areas only (as for example CityMail in Sweden which limits its delivery 
areas to densely populated regions).  
We conclude that the postal distribution constitutes not only a contestable natural 
monopoly. It is a readily contested natural monopoly whose economies of density are not 
completely exploited because of USO constraints. In light of various market entries observed 
in (partially) liberalized markets, this interpretation offers a reasonable explanation for 
our theoretical estimation results.  
In terms of overall economic welfare these findings raise some important 
questions. Market entries that build on incumbent USO constraints (one might think of 
picking the cherries grown by USO constraints) and raise the incumbent’s per piece 
                                                     
45 Besides asymmetric USO constraints other possible reasons include inefficiencies of postal 
operators, strategic decisions of mailers (e.g. press titles), or stranded costs such as higher 
salaries due to the civil servant status of the past. Due to Cohen (1997) Swiss Posts 
advantage due to scale effects is smaller than its disadvantage due to higher labor costs.    
46 Germany foresees a public procurement procedure after complete liberalization. FMO is 
scheduled for 2008. Debates on prolonging Deutsche Post’s exclusive license are ongoing.  
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costs and therefore are not necessary socially or economically efficient. For the overall 
welfare consequences the reader is referred to Section 4. However, the USO issue further 
limits the potential of end-to-end competition and potentially favors market models 
based on restricted entry in delivery (reserved areas or worksharing) where economies 
of density are optimally exploited given USO constraints. 
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4. Overall Welfare Impact of Various Scenarios of Liberalization 
4.1 Introduction 
The European Union is about to open up its domestic letter markets for end-to-end 
competition by gradually abolishing the reserved areas of the former historical state-
owned incumbents. According to Directive 2008/6/EC, the last postal monopoly in the 
EC will be history in 201347. In contrast to the European developments, the United States 
developed worksharing as a means to introduce competition in the postal sector. 
Worksharing is an access like outsourcing policy based on a rigid letters monopoly 
where private operations are compensated for upstream activities by USPS’s avoided 
costs. Up to now, the only example of a combination of the two policies is Great Britain. 
This combination is referred to as “access with bypass”. However, worldwide letter 
services remain national monopolies in most countries. Figure 12 provides an overview 
of the four main regulations of letters markets.  
As introduced in Chapter 1, the Swiss universal service provider (USP) is Swiss 
Post, which currently enjoys a (residual) monopoly on addressed letters up to a weight 
of 100 grams. The Swiss government has the power to open up the letter market if the 
provision of the universal service obligation (USO) remains guaranteed. Hence, prior to any 
further market opening, it is crucial to know how competition affects the financial 
viability of Swiss Post with or without a licensing system. Such a licensing system has 
been introduced in the liberalized parcels market. The Swiss regulatory authority 
PostReg is entitled to collect licensing fees that amount up to 3% on an entrant’s 
turnover to compensate Swiss Post for its universal service provision if needed. Up to 
                                                     
47  A short overview on the debate in Europe provides Finger (2007). Cf. Trinkner (2008) for a 
discussion of the 2008 postal directive. Note that, despite full market opening, most 
European countries will continue to grant their historical operators VAT exemptions on 
universal services. Examples include the UK, Germany and France. Given VAT rates of 
about 20%, such policies might result in market entry barriers and continuing de facto 
monopolies.   
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now, licensees have not been charged anything as Swiss Post’s obligations have been 
outweighed by the residual monopoly.   
Figure 12: Overview over various liberalization and regulatory policies 
 
 
The chapter provides insights on the consequences of different kinds of 
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examine welfare effects and financial consequences for both Swiss Post and potential 
market entrants. We start with an analysis of what would happen if the current 
regulation of the parcels market were applied to the letter market. 
The chapter proceeds as follows and bases on Dietl, Trinkner and Bleisch (2005). In 
Section 4.2, we develop and tailor a game theoretic model to the Swiss postal system. In 
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4.2 Basic model and formal results  
The main challenge in assessing consequences of various liberalization and 
regulation scenarios to the Swiss letter market is to correctly predict future outcomes of 
competition. We know the figures of the (residual) monopoly regulation of today, but 
we do not know how new entrants will enter the market and how the various market 
players will behave. Economists all agree that for the case of “perfect competition”, 
liberalization would increase overall welfare due to better products at lower costs 
(marginal cost rule). However, in reality, perfect markets do not exist. Hence, we have to 
systematically relax some key assumptions of perfect markets in order to develop a 
market model that maps reality in a stylized and reasonable way.  
4.2.1. Modeling competition in postal markets 
The experience of liberalized network industries including posts indicates that we 
have to expect oligopolistic competition with just view market players. I.e., strategic 
interaction takes place between operators and prices are rarely set according to marginal 
costs. Most probably, game theory has to be applied, especially if the industry’s cost 
structure does not exhibit constant returns to scale as shown in Chapter 3. Completely 
liberalized letters markets such as Sweden, Finland, the UK, or New Zealand point into 
the same direction. Further, we have to deal with the issue of “universal service”, which is 
imposed on the market by regulations in different variations. For example, if the 
universal service obligation (USO) was imposed on just one market player (just duties, 
no rights), this could distort the competitive outcome and could harm the viability of the 
universal service provider (USP).  
Thus, the effects of competition on prices, quality, innovation, overall welfare, and 
universal service provision and financing are not a priori clear.  In order to analyze the 
effects of liberalization in the Swiss letter market, we use a standard game theoretic 
approach as outlined in Figure 13. We use a Bertrand competition framework with 
product differentiation to reflect that there are no binding capacity constraints in the 
postal sector. Furthermore, we observe large price spreads in liberalized market 
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segments combined with some differentiation of operators in terms of product features 
and quality.  
 On the supply side, we let Swiss Post as incumbent I compete with a 
representative entrant E.  The demand side links the two operators. Customers value the 
available products with respect to quality and prices. Strategic interaction takes place, 
where one operator’s behavior affects both operators’ profits. For example, when the 
incumbent raises its prices, some consumers will switch to the entrant and boost the 
entrant’s sales. Further, a licensing system is introduced, where entrants eventually have 
to pay licensing fees in order to compensate the incumbent for its USO-obligations. By 
identifying Nash solutions, we can compute equilibrium prices which determine 
quantities, profits and overall welfare.   
Figure 13: Model outline 
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4.2.2. Model specification 
On the demand side, we assume a representative sender with quasilinear 
preferences with respect to money48. The quasilinearity implies a cardinal utility 
measure that enables us to compute and compare overall welfare of different market 
structures. To obtain linear demand curves, we assume a quadratic utility function over 
every quantity of mail qirs sent in segment s of region r through the network of operator 
i. Formally, we follow De Donder et al. (2001) and write total utility U as  
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where a, b, e > 0 and m is the amount of money spent on other goods. The last term 
reflects the fact that the mail services offered by the two operators are not perfect 
substitutes but rather differentiated products. The higher the degree of differentiation, 
the closer to zero is parameter e. Parameters a and b determine the market size and the 
slope of the demand curve. 
A consequence of this utility specification is that demand in one market does not 
affect demand in another one. That is, cross-price elasticities between the market 
segments are zero and operators cannot increase demand in one market segment by 
serving an additional segment, i.e. no network externalities are directly included.  
Utility maximization implies that our representative consumer satisfies with 
equality the budget constraint ΣΣ( pIrs qIrs + pErs qErs)+ m ≤ Y, where pirs is the price the 
consumer has to pay to operator i for the mail product s delivered to region r. Y 
represents the initial wealth endowment of the economy. By computing the first-order 
                                                     
48 Having in mind that most senders are businesses, quasilinearity is a reasonable 
assumption in the modeled riskless world. Businesses invest into mail as long as the NPV 
of an additional mailing is nonnegative, i.e. marginal utility of mail is greater than or equal 
to 1. Further, in an economy like Switzerland where postal consumption is small 
compared to total expenditure, postal consumption will be independent of the initial 
wealth endowment Y. 
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conditions of the Lagrange function and solving the resulting equation system, we 
obtain the demand functions for the incumbent and the competitor as 
( ) ( ).),( 211 rsjrsirsjrsiebrsjrsirsi eppeaappq rs +−−= −  ( 7 ) 
The slope of the demand curve in a given market is equal for both operators. 
Quantities are negatively related to the own price and positively to the price of the 
competitor (∂qi/∂pi < 0; ∂qi/∂pj > 0). Furthermore, quantities increase with a higher 
degree of product differentiation (i.e., a smaller e).   
On the supply side, pricing possibilities and cost structures determine profit 
functions. In the case of unregulated competition, where the incumbent and the entrant 
face no regulatory restrictions on pricing and production decisions, the operators are 
able to differentiate prices for every market segment and hence take into account 
demand properties specified in (7). We assume that there are no economies of scope 
between products, segments or regions. This assumption allows us to treat the 
production decision in each market segment independently. 
Total costs per segment consist of a fixed and variable part. Entry occurs only if 
entrant E’s earnings exceed variable costs cq and fixed costs F.49 In contrast, the 
incumbent’s fixed costs cannot be avoided (due to USO-obligations, the incumbent can 
not exit the market, cf. Section 3.8 for a discussion). The introduction of fixed costs is 
equivalent to increasing economies of scale and density. As we do not explicitly model 
economies of scope, the market has the property of a natural monopoly especially in 
those segments where fixed costs are high.  
4.2.3. Regulated Competition with Swiss licensing system 
So far, there was no political or regulatory authority captured in the model. When 
such authorities set market rules, they usually change the underlying cost structures of 
                                                     
49 This is a main difference in contrast to many existing entry models where entrants are 
assumed to behave as a competitive fringe with prices equal to marginal costs. See for 
example De Donder et al. (2006). 
– 52 –  
the various operators. In Switzerland, the incumbent Swiss Post must provide universal 
service. This USO contains uniform tariffs across regions and service provision in every 
market segment50. Additionally, the reserved services (i.e. letters up to 100 gram) of 
Swiss Post have to finance a transfer T to cover the deficit in the postal offices51. If the 
incumbent does not break even due to cherry-picking entrants, the regulatory authority 
is entitled to charge licensing fees. Such fees are collected as a fixed fraction μ of the 
entrant’s turnover. We treat μ  as an exogenous parameter. Under such a regulatory 
regime, the profit functions in a given market segment are 
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Profit maximization yields s(r+1) first-order conditions (FOC). Substituting the 
demand functions (7) into these first-order conditions, we obtain the reaction functions 
for the two operators. For the case of two regions D (dense) and R (rural), the two 
reaction functions in a given market segment s are 
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The incumbent’s reaction function is much more complicated because it must 
average its price over the two regions. By solving this equation system, we obtain the 
equilibrium prices for each operator given that entry occurs, (i.e. the entrant’s revenues 
exceed variable and fixed costs): 
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50  We do not model all elements of Swiss Post’s USO constraints. For a comprehensive 
overview of the current obligations faced by Swiss Post cf. PWC (2006b).  
51  Cf. Buser et al. (2008) for a detailed analysis.  
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Once this price is calculated, we obtain the price of the entrant by appropriately 
substituting this result into (9). If the entry condition is satisfied, the corresponding 
quantities can be calculated with the demand functions in (7).  
If entry is not profitable at the incumbent’s price in (10), the above formulae no 
longer hold. For example, if the entrant fails to break even in the dense area, the 
incumbent can improve its profits by increasing the price up to the limit at which the 
entrant just breaks even.  Such a limit price pLimit could be calculated as follows: 
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This ‘opponent break even price’ is limited by the monopoly price pM. However, 
because of uniform pricing, any increase in the incumbent’s price affects both regions 
and it is not clear how to balance the two different ‘opponent break even prices’ in every 
situation. In our simulation, we solve this problem numerically through appropriate use 
of the entrant’s reaction and profit functions. With the resulting equilibrium prices, 
quantities and profits we can compute overall welfare by subtracting industry expenses 
from gross utility (due to quasilinear preferences). Doing so is equivalent to summing 
consumer net utility and the operators’ profits. 
4.2.4. Licensing fees lead to higher prices 
Expressions (9) and (10) yield a first interesting result. Because the first derivative 
with respect to the licensing rate μ is positive under reasonable calibration, the 
incumbent will increase prices the more the regulator tries to finance the incumbent’s 
USO through the licensing system. Intuitively, one would expect exactly the opposite. 
To see the intuition behind this result, we first study the impact of an increase in μ on 
the price of the entrant. To offset the negative effect of higher unit costs, the entrant 
must respond with an increase in prices; a higher licensing fee reduces the 
competitiveness of the entrant in equilibrium. Now the incumbent can charge a slightly 
higher price without losing any volume and thus further increases profits.  
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The financial effects to the incumbent can be identified by analyzing the marginal 
effect of μ on its profit function:  
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The first term is the direct effect and represents the positive impact of the collected 
licensing fees. This direct effect equals pEqE and is positive. The second and third terms 
represent indirect effects arising from price responses of both operators. The second 
term is zero at the optimum (because of the FOC). The third term is positive because 
both parts are positive (prices are strategic complements and both optimal prices 
increase with the license fee). We can therefore conclude that the incumbent’s profits 
increase with a higher licensing fee. Thus, the licensing fee will help to sustain the USO, 
but will lead to a higher overall price level. 
4.3 Calibration with Swiss Data 
In order to predict price and welfare effects more precisely, we simulate the model 
using Swiss data. In Switzerland, geographic characteristics have a major impact on the 
cost structure of services. Differences in delivery time per household between dense and 
rural areas are significant and vary between delivery offices as much as 1:6. 
Accordingly, we divide the market into a dense region D and a rural region R.  
To reflect the market structure we segment the market into five basic market 
segments s. The two basic sender groups, “businesses” and “households,” can choose 
between two products “slow mail” and “fast mail.” In addition, businesses have the 
option of mass mail. Crossing regions and segments yields ten submarkets.  
4.3.1. Demand parameters 
To estimate the demand functions (7) for each operator in each submarket, we 
must calibrate the parameters a and b with market data from 2003, when Swiss Post was 
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still the only operator in the letter market and charged regulated prices. Rewriting (7) 
for the case of this regulated monopoly (RM) we get in every segment 
RM
RM
b
papq 200320032003 )(
−=  with price elasticity .1 
2003
2003
2003 q
p
bRM
−=ε  ( 11 ) 
After rearranging (11), we can directly calibrate parameter b with prices, quantities 
and elasticities from 2003.  
Parameter ai influences the size of the market of the two operator’s services. By 
setting aI > aE, we can include effects like customer inertia, reputation effects, switching 
costs, or even quality differences like universal service provision that work in favor of 
the USP. Formally, we define x as the percentage of total demand the incumbent 
receives if the entrant were to offer the same price for its services. In the remainder of 
the chapter, we will refer to x as “incumbent advantage.” For calibration we evaluate 
demand given in (7) at 2003 prices for both operators and solve the resulting equation 
system. We obtain 
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Table 7 summarizes the major demand characteristics of the model. According to 
its 2003 annual report, Swiss Post delivered about 2.8 billion pieces of addressed mail, of 
which we assume 25% was destined to rural areas. The price elasticities are a delicate 
issue for two reasons. First, there is considerable divergence of opinion on the level. See 
Harding (2004) for an overview and Chapter 2 for a computation for aggregate Swiss 
mail data. Second, price elasticities determine the steepness of the demand curves; 
competition is more effective and leads to higher welfare results if price elasticities are 
greater, ceteris paribus. The most recent data of Swiss Post suggests that the values in 
Table 1 are overestimated. These reflect our assumptions based on estimations from 
former Swiss data and Chapter 2, studies from other countries, and industry experts. 
However, we expect mail elasticity to grow over time due to an increase of substitutes as 
shown in Chapter 2 (Figure 4). Therefore, we stay on the safe side with the 
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overestimation. The main intuition behind the differences between segments is a 
substantially higher value per sent item for households (so businesses are more price 
sensitive), and an increasing variety of urgent communication possibilities such as e-
mail resulting in a higher elasticity of fast mail compared to slow mail52.  
Table 7: Major demand characteristics 
 Market size 2003 Prices 2003  
(in €)53 
Price elasticity Incumbent 
advantage 
Fast Mail B  21 % 0.56 -0.5 70 % 
Fast Mail HH 6 % 0.60 -0.4 75 % 
Slow Mail B 26 % 0.43 -0.4 65 % 
Slow Mail HH 6 % 0.47 -0.3 70 % 
Mass Mail B 39 % 0.33 -0.4 60 % 
 
The incumbent advantage x is assumed to be higher for households than for 
businesses because of higher relative switching and information costs. The experiences 
from other liberalized postal, telecommunications or electricity markets support our 
assumptions; recent examples in Switzerland include Swiss Post in the parcels market. 
4.3.2. Cost structure 
For the production side of our little economy we estimate variable and fixed costs 
for collection, processing, delivery and overhead. This detailed attribution is somewhat 
artificial, as some economies of scale and scope get partially lost. Such effects could be 
included numerically, but then we could not compute unique equilibrium formulae 
anymore. 
Table 8 shows how costs differ in the various market segments. In a first step, we 
map total costs based on data from Swiss Post’s 2003 annual report onto processes (see 
Figure 10 for the postal value chain). Thereby we first corrected total cost by subtracting 
the € 234 million contribution that the addressed letter products paid last year to finance 
                                                     
52 This assumption is consistent with recent observations that customers are willing to switch 
to slow mail products after price increases. 
53 Throughout the book we assume an exchange rate of 1€ = 1.5 CHF.   
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the postal outlet network’s deficit. In line with empirical and technical estimations from 
comparable countries in Europe, Table 8 shows that delivery accounts for the largest 
portion of total costs (for average European values cf. Table 4).  
In a second step, we attribute these process costs to market segments and regions. 
The figures are estimates and cannot reflect the economies of scope between the various 
segments and processes. Implicitly, we assume that collection costs are much higher for 
households and slightly higher for fast mail segments. Processing is slightly more 
expensive for fast mail but cheaper for mass mail because of extended presorting 
possibilities. Delivery costs are mainly determined by the quantity per segment and are 
slightly more expensive for fast mail and household segments. Overhead spreads 
equally over all segments.  
Table 8: Major cost characteristics 
 Collection Processing Delivery Overhead 
 10 % 30 % 55 % 5 % 
Cost attribution to market segments 
Fast Mail B  15 % 20 % 24 % 20 % 
Fast Mail HH 38 % 17 % 8 % 20 % 
Slow Mail B 10 % 18 % 26 % 20 % 
Slow Mail HH 30 % 16 % 6 % 20 % 
Mass Mail B 7 % 29 % 36 % 20 % 
 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Fraction of variable costs 
Incumbent 50 % 80 % 40 % 10 % 
Entrant 75 % 85 % 50 % 50 % 
 
For the implemented scale effects, the fraction of fixed costs is important. In 
Switzerland, the number of letters per capita is the second largest in the world54. Hence, 
the total time the mail carriers need to reach the various delivery points is almost fixed 
and the economies of scale in delivery are large. For a detailed discussion and 
computation of economies of scale, density and scope the reader is referred to Chapter 3. 
In accordance with most of the literature (e.g. NERA 2004), we assume that processing 
                                                     
54 Depending on the data source Switzerland has the highest or second highest scale (behind 
the US). See Bundesnetzagentur (2006) for an overview based on UPU 2004 figures or 
PWC (2006b) for a recent assessment of the scale of Switzerland. 
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costs are much more elastic. In total, about 50% of the incumbent’s total costs are fixed. 
Compared to the incumbent, whose infrastructure is historically grown, designed for 
private customers and more capital intensive (postal outlets, sorting centers, delivery 
offices), the entrant’s percentage of variable costs is higher. 
So far, the main difference between the two operators was the entrant’s lower 
fraction of fixed costs. According to current observations in the Swiss parcel market, 
competitors pay lower wages. As stated by the labor unions, the wage premium is 
currently around 16%55 and hits the incumbent especially hard because about 80% of 
total costs are labor costs. The network design tailored to business customers further 
reduces the entrant’s cost. We assume the upstream efficiency advantage (collection and 
presorting) of about 30% to reflect the savings realized by computerized sorting in the 
printing stage. In delivery, this advantage is much smaller (5%). Most business mailings 
are business-to-consumer. Consequently, one large customer causes a great deal of 
delivery points. Hence, a delivery network similar to that of the incumbent is needed 
with limited ways of cost innovation (the work is mainly physical). Nevertheless 
entrants can obtain cost savings by limiting themselves on just a view delivery days per 
week.  
4.4 Results on Monopoly and on End-to-End Competition 
With the calibrated model, we are now able to give some insight into the overall 
welfare consequences of various regulatory frameworks. In addition, we can perform 
sensitivity analysis and derive recommendations for postal operators on the strategies 
they should pursue under specific market rules. We focus on the first question and carry 
out sensitivity analysis only to judge the robustness of the results. In a first step, we 
evaluate the regulated monopoly of Swiss Post of 2003. Next, we analyze different forms 
of end-to-end competition (complete liberalization without access possibilities) and 
                                                     
55 Recent figures of PostReg (2005, 2006, 2007) indicate that Swiss Post’s licensed competitors 
have a turnover of about CHF 60’000 per FTE. This is considerably less than Swiss Post’s 
average labor cost in the letters section.  Hence, the 16% could be well underestimated. 
PWC (2006b) assumes a labor cost advantage of about 25%. 
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change the introduced model slightly where needed. The monopoly scenarios serve 
primarily as a benchmark. 
The quantitative results presented in this section serve as rough guidelines in 
which directions the examined regulatory regimes influence the market equilibrium in 
terms of prices, quantities, surpluses, and profits. 
4.4.1. Monopoly: Positive effects of a price freeze 
It is straightforward to evaluate the regulated monopoly (RM) of 2003, since the 
model was calibrated with data of 2003. Swiss post charged uniform prices at an average 
of 44 cents. With the underlying cost structure, the resulting loss was € 54 million, thus 
Swiss Post was close to break even despite of the USO. From now on, we will use this 
scenario as a benchmark reflecting the status quo56. 
As a second benchmark, we examine the case of an unregulated monopoly (UM). 
What would happen, if the incumbent charged profit maximizing uniform prices? The 
results are interesting. The monopolist almost doubles its prices to 82 cents on average 
and thereby boosts its profit up to € 349 million. Profits are positive in all market 
segments except for fast mail for households in rural areas. However, the higher price 
level reduces consumer welfare dramatically: despite the high profit, a net welfare 
decrease of € -497 million results. Table 9 presents the details. 
Table 9: Results monopoly cases 
Legal Monopoly Regulated  Unregulated  
Average Price 0.44 0.82 
Quantities (in Mio) 2836 1'787 
Consumer Surplus 1491 591 
Profit after transfer -54 349 
Welfare 1'437 940 
Welfare change  -497 
 
                                                     
56 At this point, we note that there was a price increase in Switzerland in the beginning of 
2004 due to the deficit in the postal network. 
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We conclude that Swiss Post did not charge monopoly prices in 200357. For that 
reason, one could view the legal framework of 2003 as an effective price cap combined 
with a break-even constraint. However, one does not know whether the regulated 
monopolist produced efficient.  
4.4.2. End-to-end Competition: universal service at risk 
In theory, competition leads to positive welfare effects mainly due to marginal cost 
pricing, improved efficiency, and product innovation. To reflect these potential benefits, 
we equipped the entrant with a substantial efficiency advantage. Additionally, we 
assume that the entrant improves product diversification, technically we set e = 0.7558. 
However, it is not clear for two main reasons, whether these positive effects lead to an 
increase in overall welfare. First, positive economies of scale diminish when entry 
occurs, so the market ends up with larger industry wide production costs. Second, the 
combination of a relatively inelastic demand with product differentiation possibilities 
could lead to oligopolistic pricing rather than marginal cost pricing. It will be interesting 
to see whether the model predicts prices above or below the ones from 2003.  
In our first end-to-end competition case, hereafter referred to “Regulated 
Competition (RC)”, there are no restrictions on market entry. The incumbent must fulfill 
the universal service obligation as presented in Section 4.2. In return, the entrant must 
pay a licensing fee of 3% of its turnover. Table 10 depicts the results. 
The model predicts an overall welfare decrease with universal service at risk. 
Despite an 18% increase in the overall price level, the incumbent’s loss rises to about € 
189 million. Entry occurs in all three dense business segments. Both operators make 
substantial profits with single-piece business mail. The incumbent reaches its best 
margins in rural business segments where no economies of scale and density are lost. 
The main losses occur in the household segments. The results are straightforward and 
                                                     
57 Only if elasticities were assumed to be 3.5 times larger than the values in table 1, the model 
would predict monopoly pricing for Swiss Post in 2003. 
58 In line with De Donder (2001) and Dietl and Waller (2002). 
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support similar findings from Panzar (2001, 2002), Crew and Kleindorfer (2002), Dietl 
and Waller (2002), Waller (2001), and De Donder (2004).  
The incumbent’s main problem arises from the combination of universal service 
provision and uniform pricing. The entrant is able to undercut the incumbent in the 
dense segments and “picks the cherries,” offered by the incumbent’s tariff balancing act 
between the dense and rural region. This cherry-picking effect is much stronger than the 
cure for it, the licensing system. The entrant has to pay no more than € 15 million in 
licensing fees, a sum that represents less than 10% of its profits (and the incumbent’s 
loss).  
We observe a lot of price differentiation between the various market segments. 
Prices for households rise about 50%, whereas the average price in business segments 
rises about 10%, despite the entrant’s cheaper prices.  
Table 10: Results End-to-End Competition 
 Regulated   
(uniform pricing for I) 
Unregulated  
(non uniform pricing) 
Licensing Rate μ = 0% μ = 3% μ = 20% μ = 0% μ = 3% μ = 20% 
       
Average Price (€)       
Incumbent 0.56 0.57 0.48 0.43 0.45 0.50 
Entrant* 0.39 0.39 0.43 0.38 0.39  
Average 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.43 0.44 0.50 
       
Quantities (Mio #)       
Incumbent 1'652 1'631 2'408 2'540 2'503 2'571 
Entrant 1'176 1'177 350 322 323 - 
Total 2'828 2'808 2'759 2'863 2'826 2'571 
       
Welfare (Mio €)       
Consumer Surplus 1'351 1'331 1'356 1'481 1'444 1'246 
Profit I after transfer -217 -196 -27 -124 -97 82 
Profit Entrant 168 159 36 41 39 - 
Welfare 1'302 1'294 1'365 1'398 1'386 1'328 
Welfare change** -135 -143 -72 -39 -51 -109 
       
Other        
Licensing Fees (€) - 14 30 - 4 - 
Entry in # segments 3 3 1 1 1 - 
*   The values in this row represent weighted averages in active market segments. 
** Values compared to the regulated monopoly case 
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One promising strategy for the USP against this kind of cherry picking is to 
abolish the uniform price. In such an Unregulated Competition (UC) the incumbent can 
differentiate its prices between regions. To implement this regulatory framework into 
the model, we make appropriate changes to expressions (2), (3) and (4). Doing so results 
in major change. The USP can now prevent entry in all segments except slow mail 
business. In the three market segments in which the entrant cannot enter anymore, we 
observe predatory behavior. The incumbent sets prices below the optimal prices in (4) to 
turn the entrant’s profit into a deficit; the entrant cannot break even anymore and no 
entry occurs. The incumbent is better off because he defends 100% of the market. From 
this combination of predatory pricing and price discrimination between regions, 
consumers gain a € 100 million net surplus; the incumbent’s prices are much lower on 
average, e.g. mass mailers gain about € 70 million net surplus (on the cost of rural 
regions). Nevertheless, there are also losers, namely the entrant and the less price elastic 
households in rural areas where tariffs explode by more than 100%.  
Compared to the regulated competition, the model predicts an overall welfare 
gain of € 92 million and a better financial situation for the incumbent. Still, the results 
are worse than in the case of the regulated monopoly of 2003. However, the welfare 
effects of this unregulated competition may be overestimated. There are several 
justifications for uniform pricing the model does not include. Examples are political 
reasons, menu and transaction costs, network externalities, and unwanted redistribution 
from rural regions and households to businesses, etc. We leave these extensions for 
further research. Table 10 summarizes the results.  
4.4.3. Ambiguous effects of the licensing rate μ 
For the above results, we assumed a licensing rate of 3%. If no licensing fee were 
collected (μ = 0%), the results would change only slightly. As predicted in Section 4.2.3, 
both operators offer lower prices. Consequently, the incumbent’s loss rises by an 
additional € 21 million, which is more than the foregone licensing fees (€ 14 million). 
Thus, the indirect effect of the licensing system is in this case € 7 million (caused by price 
changes). The lower rate increases the entrant’s potential profit margin, weakens the 
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entry barrier function of the licensing system and leads to higher losses for the 
incumbent.  
If the licensing rate is set to 20%, we observe a further important aspect of the 
licensing system. In the case of RC, we observe now only one market entry instead of 
three. The licensing system turns into a barrier to entry. In this special case, the entry 
barrier is desirable because the threat of entry forces the incumbent to charge low prices. 
As a result, overall welfare increases and the incumbent almost beaks even due to the 
indirect effect worth € 156 million (direct effect = additional 16 million). These good 
results are only one side of the coin, as we can see for the case of UC, where the 
incumbent’s prices rise and welfare decreases. If the licensing rate is too high, the threat 
of entry is too low and the incumbent improves profits at the cost of overall welfare.  
Figure 14 gives further insight into the mechanism of the licensing system. Under 
Regulated Competition, the incumbent breaks even with a licensing rate of 23%. Welfare 
is maximized at 26%. This is the point at which the entrant has to give up service even in 
the last segment (slow mail businesses). Still the threat of entry persists and sets the 
upper bound for the incumbent’s prices. Any further rate increase would decrease the 
threat of entry and the incumbent (now a monopolist) can adjust his prices towards the 
profit maximizing unregulated monopoly solution.  
Figure 14: Impact of the licensing rate on welfare and profits 
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In the case of Unconstrained Competition, the optimal licensing rate is 0% where 
entry occurs in only one market segment. Up to a rate of 10%, the entrant stays in. At 
10%, the incumbent is able to push the entrant out of the market by profitable predatory 
pricing. This discrete drop in prices yields the welfare jump that can be seen in the 
graph. From now on, any increase of the licensing rate reduces welfare. 
4.4.4. Comparison of the four regulatory regimes and first conclusions 
Having calculated overall price levels as well as the welfare of the different market 
rules, we are now able to make normative statements about which of the four scenarios 
a welfare-maximizing regulator should prefer. None of the competitive scenarios 
described above could reach the welfare of the Regulated Monopoly of 2003, even if a 
regulator maximized welfare with an optimal licensing rate. The model gives the 
following ordering in terms of welfare59: 
  
If we apply these results to Switzerland, neither of the discussed competition 
scenarios is efficient. End-to-end competition does not necessarily lead to lower prices 
because of strategic interaction and the contested natural monopoly in delivery which 
yields a duplication of fixed costs. Welfare is likely to decrease, and Swiss Post’s ability 
to fund its universal service obligation is heavily reduced. These conclusions include 
positive effects of competition, such as higher product choice and a highly more efficient 
entrant.  
In a dynamic context, Regulated “Competition” with a licensing rate between 20% 
and 25% might still be best because a profit-maximizing incumbent has direct incentives 
to reduce costs further. Suppose a regime in which the regulator reduces the licensing 
rate yearly by 1% for ten years. If the incumbent is able to reduce his costs 
appropriately, it can lower prices further to prevent a competitor’s entry and thereby 
                                                     
59 Only if elasticities are assumed at least 50% higher than the ones in Table 1, both 
competition scenarios turn out to be better than RM. As pointed out in section 3, the most 
recent market data rejects such high elasticity values.  
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secure a 100% market share for exploiting the scale effects in distribution. From this 
point of view, a regulatory system similar to the one in Finland is reasonable.  
There are various other ways to introduce competition in the letter market. One 
could relax universal service restrictions further, find other mechanisms for financing 
the USO (taxes, fixed licensing rates, last mile pricing, etc), introduce various forms of 
access regimes, copy US Worksharing, or combine the discussed competition designs 
with price cap regulation. The next section deals with two of those possibilities, namely 
price cap and Worksharing as a means to foster competition in the letter market. 
4.5 Worksharing and Price Freeze Competition 
Worksharing aims to minimize the costs of industry-wide service provision in the 
US letter market. The incumbent United States Postal Service (USPS) is granted a 
monopoly in delivery (“downstream monopoly”), whereas competitors can perform 
upstream services like collection and presorting just as well60. For these upstream 
services, USPS gives “worksharing discounts” on the official retail prices based on the 
avoided cost rule, depending on the value of the competitor’s services for USPS. The 
system makes sense in economic terms if delivery has the property of a (contestable) 
natural monopoly and its innovation potential is limited in contrast to upstream 
services. Worksharing evolved over the last 30 years. In 2004, about 70% of total US mail 
volume was workshared and the sum of all worksharing discounts totaled about US$ 14 
                                                     
60 In fact, the USPS is granted a rigid monopoly that consists of two parts. (1) A reserved area 
for letters up to about 350 grams, and (2) a monopoly on recipients mail boxes. For 
example news papers companies are not allowed to deliver the daily newspaper into the 
mailbox. In terms of pricing the USPS is restricted not to grant worksharing discounts that 
exceed avoided costs. Hence, worksharing is essentially an outsourcing measure where 
competitors are given incentives by the USPS to perform upstream services whenever 
more efficient than the USPS. In this light, studies such as Kruse (2005) that conclude from 
analyzing US Worksharing that access should be introduced in the liberalized EU market 
are problematic. Such a combination of access and FMO has complex and potentially 
harmful effects in terms of USO financing. Further, incentive structures between operators 
are fundamentally changed. See Section 4.6 for a discussion. 
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Billion. Worksharing is fundamentally different from the European approach of market 
opening. Figure 15 opposes the two models.  
Figure 15: EU market opening compared to US worksharing 
 
 
4.5.1. Modeling Worksharing 
To compare Worksharing (WS) with the regulatory frameworks discussed above, 
some small changes of the model are needed. We change the demand side only to the 
extent that two calibration values are slightly changed. First, we reduce the incumbent 
advantage x in all segments by 50% (i.e. xnew = ½xold + ¼) because the entrant takes some 
advantage of the incumbent’s downstream reputation and quality. Customers will 
switch faster to the entrant. Second, product differentiation possibilities are smaller 
because the entrant cannot deliver anymore. Therefore, we assume the product 
differentiation factor e to rise to 0.85. In other words, the two services of the two 
operators are still considered as two different products and demand is still described by 
(7). 
The major changes are on the cost side, as the entrant is legally obliged to buy the 
downstream services from the incumbent. In return, the entrant receives a discount of δs 
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s61. In other words, the entrant pays the access price A = pI - δ to the incumbent for final 
processing and delivery (see Figure 16). The entrant’s variable costs for its upstream 
activities are cEu, whereas the incumbent’s variable costs split up in an upstream and 
downstream part, i.e.  cI = cIu + cId.  
Figure 16: Stylized worksharing model 
Incumbent I
Entrant E
Upstream
(e.g. collection, presorting, 
barcoding)
δ−= IpA
Iuc
Euc
Idc
Downstream
(final processing, delivery)
 
 
Since the universal service obligation can now be financed by the downstream 
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4.5.2. US Worksharing – a Pareto Improvement 
In the US, both retail prices and worksharing discounts are regulated.  The Postal 
Rate Commission (PRC) is entitled to give its recommendations about pricing issues 
raised by the USPS62. Worksharing discounts are calculated using ECPR, where 
                                                     
61  I.e. the modeled worksharing system is very stylized. In the US, there are various classes 
of worksharing discounts, and private operators need not to do all the upstream work as 
one block. They can specialize in any single discount.   
62 Refers to the legislation up to 2006. Meanwhile, the PRC was renamed into Postal 
Regulatory Commission with new competences, the rate setting process was replaced by 
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discounts equal USPS’ cost savings for the respective worksharing activity (“avoided 
costs”).  
In the model, the incumbent’s savings are exactly the upstream variable costs cIu. 
We rewrite (6) accordingly and set cIu = δ for the worksharing discount and pI = p2003 for 
the retail prices (i.e. again a price freeze to compare with the other price freeze 
scenarios). To obtain the profit-maximizing price for the entrant, we compute its first 
order condition. In equilibrium, optimal prices are 
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The results are straightforward. If entry occurs, there is a Pareto improvement 
compared to the Regulated Monopoly. The incumbent is indifferent whether to 
workshare or not and is better off if the entrant generates additional volume. Consumers 
only buy the products of the entrant if they gain net utility. The entrant can only enter if 
it charges lower prices due to more efficient production and/or it generates additional 
demand through product differentiation. In both cases, volumes increase when demand 
is downward sloping as assumed. Empirical findings from Cohen et al. (2002) support 
this argument.   
In line with the theory, the model predicts an increase in overall volume of 2.2%. 
In total 640 million letters are workshared. The welfare improvement is € 77 million and 
the sum of worksharing discount totals € 97 million. Entry occurs in 5 segments (all 
business segments but rural fast mail). We note that these nice results do not hold 
anymore if worksharing discounts were set above avoided costs. 
It is interesting to observe that the entrant charges a higher price than the 
incumbent does. Parameter analysis with different values for e shows that only for high 
values of e are the entrant’s prices lower. I.e., only if the entrant cannot differentiate its 
products relative to the incumbent’s ones, it must charge a lower price. If the entrant 
                                                                                                                                                              
price cap regulation, but avoided costs for determining worksharing discounts was 
maintained.  
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reaches to do product innovation, it might benefit from higher prices. In this case, 
consumers also benefit (their needs are better served) and, of course, so does the 
incumbent, who gets the additional volume for downstream delivery.  
Table 11: Results Worksharing and Price Cap Competition 
 US Worksharing Price Cap Competition 
 e = 0,85 e = 0,75 μ = 0% μ = 3% μ = 20% 
   
Average Price (€)  
Incumbent 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43 
Entrant 0.46 0.51 0.35 0.36 0.41 
Average 0.45 0.46 0.41 0.41 0.42 
      
Quantities (Mio #)  
Incumbent (*upstream) 2'291* 2'307* 2'073 2'079 2'432 
Entrant 640 705 1'016 1'008 538 
Total  2'932 3'012 3'090 3'088 2'970 
      
Welfare (Mio €)  
Consumer surplus 1'515 1'533 1'612 1'610 1'560 
Profit I after transfer -22 -1 -300 -287 -165 
Profit Entrant 21 48 90 79 21 
Welfare 1'514 1'580 1'402 1'402 1'416 
Welfare change (RM) +77 +143 -35 -35 -21 
Welfare change (RC)   +100 +108 +51 
      
Other   
Discounts/Fees (Mio €) 97 118 0 10 44 
Entry in # segments 5 7 3 3 2 
 
Table 11 presents detailed model results and illustrates the positive welfare and 
profit effects of a further increase in product differentiation.  
The model supports the experience from the US: Successful entry occurs in 
business segments, the USP gains and can better sustain the USO at low prices. There is 
only one group, which is worse off, namely the workforce who represents the avoided 
upstream variable costs. However, they lose much less than in the case of regulated 
competition.  
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4.5.3. Price Freeze Competition 
The two end-to-end competition cases from Section 4.4 yield much lower overall 
welfare than worksharing. One reason is the price-driving effect of the licensing system. 
To offset this price-driving effect, we supplement the RC case with a price freeze. 
Table 11 reports the results of such a “Price Cap Competition.” The price freeze has a 
positive effect on overall welfare compared to the Regulated Competition case (but not 
compared with the Regulated Monopoly) because the overall price level drops. The 
incumbent is worse off. He has no further possibility of responding competitively and 
its deficit increases up to € 287 million – the USO burden is not covered at all. Once 
again, this regulatory regime is not feasible for Switzerland from a legal point of view. 
Similar to the findings in Section 4.4, only a sufficient high licensing rate can stabilize 
the financial situation of the USP. It prevents entry, and if the rate is set accordingly, it 
gives the incumbent incentives to reduce costs and to avoid potential entry.  
4.5.4. Discussion 
Both the regulatory regimes presented in this section did help to improve overall 
welfare compared to the competition cases examined in Section 4.4. However, Price Cap 
Competition is desirable for consumers (higher net utility), but not for the ones who 
must pay the higher burden of the universal service obligation. If this burden would 
have to be paid by the consumers through a special postal tax, they are again worse off 
compared to the Regulated Monopoly of Swiss Post in 2003.  
In contrast, Worksharing seems to be the only system that can improve economic 
efficiency in the sector. Worksharing realizes the benefits of competition without 
sacrificing the economies of scale and density in delivery and putting universal service 
at risk. 
Empirically, one could try to find out how tariffs and volumes do vary between 
the different regulatory regimes applied in practice today. The model predicts that the 
United States should have large volumes per capita ceteris paribus. In liberalized 
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markets, postal operators should have problems sustaining the USO due to smaller 
volumes. In regulated monopolies (or licensing regimes with very high rates) tariffs and 
volumes should lie somewhere in between. However, such a comparison is difficult 
because demand and supply factors as well as USO-requirements vary heavily across 
nations. Figure 17 shows the development of overall mail volumes in Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the US (all three countries exhibit very high volumes per capita).  The 
figure provides some63 empirical support of our model findings.  
Figure 17: Development of overall mail volumes in selected high-volume countries 
 
Source: PTS, Swiss Post, UPS  
 
4.6 Access with Bypass 
We discussed various scenarios of end-to-end competition, and also Worksharing 
which can be seen as a regulated access scenario, where in fact just the process of 
determining access prices is regulated. I.e., access prices or worksharing discounts are 
                                                     
63 Note that the different development could have been caused by other country specific 
factors too. We leave a detailed analysis for future research. 
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computed by the USPS according to the Avoided Costs rule64 and approved by the 
regulatory commission PRC.  
We saw that end-to-end poses some problems, but Worksharing improves the 
situation. Why not just combine the two? This combination is referred to as “access with 
bypass” and enables competitors to “piecemeal bypass” the incumbent (see Figure 10 
for a graphical illustration). A recent application in practice is the United Kingdom, 
where downstream access prices are regulated and the market is completely open. Yet, 
it is two early to draw conclusions from the UK case, as it lacks both the long term 
perspective (full market opening as of 2006) and a level playing field; the incumbent 
Royal Mail still enjoys a value added tax (VAT) advantage. Whereas private competitors 
must charge VAT on their products, Royal Mail is exempt. 
We leave a simulation within our model framework for future research. However, 
there are already many economic papers on the subject, thereof a vast majority pointing 
into the same direction. Among others, Panzar (2004) and De Donder (2006) discuss the 
issue in a setting with full market opening, customer direct access, and regulated access 
prices. I.e. customers have the choice between the incumbent’s retail products, the 
incumbent’s wholesale products, and services of new competitors. These new entrants 
have the choice of providing end-to-end services, consolidation (upstream services), and 
if needed, of selectively bypassing the incumbents network by setting up own 
distribution networks where the entrant’s delivery costs are lower than the incumbent’s 
access prices. The main difference of the two papers is that Panzar minimizes uniform 
retail prices, whereas De Donder maximizes welfare. The main message of the two 
papers remains the same. “Piecemeal bypass poses more problems than end-to-end 
bypass”, i.e. end-to-end competition is preferable to regulated access with bypass 
scenarios. Even more, both papers obtain the best welfare measures for regulated access 
scenarios without bypass, which economically comes closest to the US Worksharing 
model.  
Similar results provide Armstrong (2001, 2006b), Billette de Villemeur et al. (2004a, 
2004b), Crew and Kleindorfer (2002, 2003, 2004, 2006a), De Donder et al. (2004), Calzada 
                                                     
64 equals ECPR (Efficient component pricing rule) 
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(2005), Gautier (2006), Plaut/Frontier (2007), and PWC (2006a, 2006b). The latter and 
Crew and Kleindorfer (2002, 2004) point out that in such a setting, uniform access prices 
worsen the situation compared to a zonal access pricing regime. Based on their 
simulation study, Crew and Kleindorfer (2006a) note that “prohibiting bypass yielded 
greater welfare than any of the cases that allowed bypass”. Armstrong (2006b) 
concludes that under bypass some form of output taxes for entrants would be needed to 
prevent inefficient entries. We conclude that – at least in theory – piecemeal bypass 
yields negative effects on welfare and decreases the financial power of universal service 
providers to sustain the USO. 
The underlying reasoning is, that combining end-to-end competition with some 
form of downstream access, where entrants can hand over mail to the incumbent’s 
delivery network if wanted, will provide entrants with additional possibilities of cherry 
picking by focusing on processes (in addition to customers and regions), thereby eroding 
the concept of uniform prices (and thus universal service) as operators either align 
prices to costs or lose market share. This mechanism would most probably also hold in 
Switzerland, where market entry barriers for piecemeal bypass are particularly low 
because of high mail volumes per capita. PWC (2006b) supports this argument. Hence, 
Switzerland should, in the presence of (asymmetric) universal service obligations, not 
introduce “access with bypass” regulations, i.e. combine full market opening policies 
with a regulated access regime (be it ex ante or ex post).  
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4.7 Conclusions 
Like the member states of the European Community, Switzerland is in the process 
of liberalizing its domestic postal markets. In 2004, a new postal ordinance fully opened 
the parcels market by introducing end-to-end competition using a licensing system to 
help the incumbent fund its universal service obligation.  
We asked, what would happen if the letter market were liberalized in the same 
way? To gain deeper insight on this issue, we adapted a price competition framework 
from De Donder et al. (2001), tailored it to Swiss circumstances and extended it further 
to include worksharing. The model enables quantitative comparisons between 
monopoly, competition and worksharing scenarios. Despite the limits of such a 
quantitative model, we believe that the main results are robust and straightforward. 
We identify US Worksharing65 as a Pareto improvement compared to monopoly 
regulation. Moreover, our model predicts higher welfare and much better USP stability 
than various ways of end-to-end competition with different levels of licensing rates. 
End-to-end competition with its full liberalization of the postal value chain is leading to 
serious difficulties for the incumbent to sustain the universal service requirements. The 
more restrictions are imposed on the incumbent’s pricing flexibility (uniform price, price 
freeze), the worse becomes the financial situation of the incumbent.  
We conclude that Switzerland should be very cautious when copying European 
plans of end-to-end competition. We believe caution is especially indicated when the 
assumption of high economies of scale and density in delivery truly reflects the industry 
(the results in Chapter 3 strongly underpin this presumption). Our model predicts that 
complete letter market liberalization will lead to higher prices, to much more price 
differentiation between regions and customers (in favor of business customers and 
cities), to an erosion of universal service due to Swiss Post’s attempts to adapt its 
business model to the underlying market forces and to continuous financial problems of 
the incumbent. These problems will even tighten, if a full market opening was combined 
                                                     
65 The Pareto improvement is only achieved if retail prices stay regulated and worksharing 
discounts are equal or less to avoided costs.  
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with an access regime under which competitors could use the incumbent’s delivery 
network when needed. We leave an evaluation within our model for further research. 
The model cannot cope with some dynamic advantages of competition. For 
example, there were no possibilities for Swiss Post for dynamic efficiency gains over 
time. If one believes those efficiency potentials to be large, end-to-end competition could 
still be a desirable solution. However, postal services already face increasing indirect 
competition through digital means of written communication (cf. Figure 9 page 27). The 
overall volume in single-piece mail is shrinking in most highly developed countries, 
including Switzerland despite growing written communication markets. This rapidly 
evolving “e-competition” threatens the postal services as end-to-end competition does. 
Regulated “monopolists” and worksharers are “hit” only once, whereas incumbents 
competing in fully liberalized letter markets are “hit” twice.  
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5. Pricing in Liberalized Two-Sided Mail Markets  
5.1 Introduction 
So far we have considered the postal market being a “one-sided market”. The 
results from Section 4 as well as probably any reference so far assumed implicitly that 
the recipients of mail do not affect mail demand at all. Yet, virtually any mail piece is 
basically written communication between two parties and hence it is not a priori clear 
whether we can exclude the recipient-side from our analysis. Recent developments in 
economic theory have pointed to a broad range of so called “two-sided markets” where 
platforms link two or more groups of consumers. Examples include stock exchanges 
(investors and listed companies), internet search engines (internet users and 
advertisers), or night clubs (males and females).  
Postal operators can be seen as such platforms between senders/mailers on one 
side and receivers/recipients on the other. A first analysis that incorporates the recipient 
side into the modeling exercise was undertaken by Felisberto, Finger, Friedli, 
Krähenbühl and Trinkner (2006). The model was further developed in Friedli, Jaag, 
Krähenbühl, Nielsen, Pihl and Trinkner (2006). The authors analyze the effect of the 
introduction of a two-part tariff that consists of variable postage paid by senders and a 
fixed “delivery flat rate” that recipients must pay in case they prefer doorstep delivery 
over free P.O. box delivery. Figure 18 illustrates the proposed pricing for which the 
authors find mixed effects on overall welfare.  
Figure 18: Illustration of a possible two-part tariff in the postal sector 
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If letters are a means of communication between two parties, at least one of the 
two parties has a positive willingness to pay. Postal operators offer the service that 
exploits this willingness to pay. Interestingly, virtually all postal operators apply a pre-
paid mechanism that goes back on Rowland Hill’s proposal of charging only the sender-
side of the market instead of the receivers too. However, the pre-paid mechanism of 
today involves the potential for the senders to bill the postage onward to the receivers. 
This potential varies between the various classes of mail and is essentially determined 
by the bargaining position between the two communicating parties. Postage for 
advertising mail remains on the sender-side, while postage in commercial relationships 
is usually – directly or indirectly – passed on to the receivers. E.g., Swiss banks 
increasingly bill postage for bank statements directly to their clients (i.e. the receivers).66  
The fact that mail consists of two parties communicating with each other over a 
choice of platforms (postal operators) makes the postal market potentially two-sided. If 
this two-sided market is served by only one operator (as it remains the predominant 
regulation in most countries) the designated postal operator has the necessary 
bargaining power to choose the pricing mechanism of her choice (sender pays, receiver 
pays, or a mix between the two as analyzed by Felisberto et al. (2006) and Friedli et al. 
(2006). Yet, senders and receivers are able to reallocate postage by means of negotiation 
as mentioned above.  
In competitive markets, two effects could potentially lead to different optimal 
pricing principles: (a) the historical operator loses its market power on the sender side 
because of competing networks, and (b) receivers get bargaining power in terms of 
whom to give the right to operate their P.O. box. The latter effect could in principle yield 
a situation where large receivers prefer P.O. boxes over mail boxes as the former give 
them the possibility sell their address exclusively in license to a specific operator. 
In this chapter we analyze whether the traditional pricing concept (sender pays 
principle) remains dominant in competitive postal markets. To do so, we split the postal 
market in a processing and delivery part, where a postal operator faces two kinds of 
customers: senders in the former and receivers in the latter part of the market. Based on 
                                                     
66  Often, the official single-peace tariff is billed instead of the reduced business rate. 
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the contributions by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998), Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong 
(2006a) and Panzar (2006) we develop a theoretical model with consumers' platform 
choice between two operators competing in linear upstream and two-part downstream 
prices and being interconnected by a symmetric access regime to P.O. boxes. Thereby, 
we extend the analysis of a delivery flat rate by Felisberto et al. (2006) and Friedli et al. 
(2006) to a competitive environment and assess optimum pricing schemes in market 
equilibrium. 
The paper builds mainly on Jaag and Trinkner (2008a) and is structured as follows. 
Section 5.2 discusses the background on the theory of two-sided markets and its 
relevance for postal markets. Section 5.3 presents the model outline. Section 5.4 provides 
a rough calibration of the model and presents the derived optimal pricing structure for 
the two-sided P.O. box market. We conclude in Section 5.5. 
5.2 Background – is the postal market two-sided?  
In two-sided markets, platforms enable the interaction of two or more groups of 
agents, where the surplus of one group of agents depends on the number of users that 
are connected to the platform on the other side (Armstrong 2006a). Real world examples 
of such two-sided markets with multiple platforms include many internet applications, 
the credit card industry, radio or television broadcasting, peer-to-peer networks, 
computer operating systems, or telecommunication networks. A precise definition of a 
two-sided market is given by Rochet and Tirole (2005) and depends mainly on its pricing 
properties:  
“Consider a platform charging per-interaction charges αB and αS to the buyer and the 
seller sides. The Market for interactions between the two sides is one-sided if the 
volume V of transactions realized on the platform depends only on the aggregate price 
level α = αB + αS, i.e. is insensitive to reallocations of this price between the buyer and 
the seller. If by contrast V varies with αB while α is kept constant, the market is said to 
be two-sided.” 
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Hence, postal services would not satisfy the definition of two-sided markets in 
case mail demand remained the same if postage was charged to receivers instead of 
senders. 
Two-sided markets are strongly linked with network externalities.67 Rochet and 
Tirole (2003) note, ‘many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided’. 
Armstrong (2006a) even includes (cross) network externalities in his definition of two-
sided markets: the number of subscribers of one group increases the surplus of the other 
one. Consequently, for virtually any (two-sided) platform, attaining the critical mass on 
both sides of the market is the core of the business with pricing being one of the most 
crucial success factors to overcome the chicken-and-egg problem involved when setting 
up a new platform. From this point of view, two-sided markets can be seen as the subset 
of markets with network externalities, where the allocation of prices among the various 
groups of agents affects the degree of exploitation of those externalities. This in turn is 
the case, if the platforms pricing policy cannot be offset by private redistribution 
between the various groups of agents. In postal markets for example, where postage 
predominantly is charged directly to the senders, often receivers finally pay the postage, 
as senders bill it onwards (e.g. distance selling). Hence, it is not a priori clear, if the 
postal market is two-sided. 
5.2.1. Pricing structures in two-sided markets 
In two-sided markets, we often observe pricing structures in which one side (one 
group of agents) heavily cross-subsidizes the other side of the market. Internet search 
engines provide their core business (searching the internet) for free, radio and TV 
channels are free of charge, and credit card holders even get fringe benefits for the 
frequent use of their card. Table 11 provides an overview of pricing structures in 
selected two-sided industries. 
                                                     
67  Network externalities arise if the utility that a given user derives from joining a network 
depends upon the number of other users who are in the same network. Positive network 
externalities are present if a customers’ utility of a good or service is an increasing function 
of the number of other users. 
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At a first glance, the cross-subsidization is astonishing as both sides in each of 
those markets derive a positive utility of the platform and thus in principle would have 
a positive willingness to pay. Yet, those pricing policies persist even in mature markets, 
and it appears dominant in competitive two-sided markets not to exploit the willingness 
to pay on one side of the market. 
Table 12: Overview of pricing structures in two-sided markets 
 Credit Card Search 
engine 
Electronic 
Document 
viewing 
Mobile Direct Mail 
Side 1: 
Originator  
Payer (Buyer) Searcher Reader Caller Sender 
(Advertiser) 
Pricing Small or zero 
subscriber 
fee, fringes 
with use  
Free Free (zero 
license charge 
for adobe 
reader) 
Per minute, 
subscriber fee 
Per peace 
charge 
 
Platform 
(Examples) 
American 
Express, Visa, 
Mastercard 
Google, 
Yahoo! 
Adobe Writer 
and Reader 
Mobile 
networks 
Postal 
operators 
 
Side 2: 
Enabler 
Payee (Seller) Content 
provider / 
Advertiser 
Content 
providers 
Receiver Receiver 
Pricing 
 
Subscriber 
fee,  % of 
transaction 
amount,  
Price per hit Licensing 
costs 
Mostly free, 
subscriber fee 
Free 
    
In general, the cross-subsidization aims at establishing a consumer base that as a 
whole can be sold to a group of individual commercial agents aiming to sell products to 
this consumer base. Thus, most two-sided markets are in effect intermediaries that 
derive their economic value by reducing transaction costs or information asymmetries 
(mostly between sellers and potential buyers). To get the critical mass and resolving the 
typical chicken-and-egg problem, the dominant strategy appears to heavily cross-
subsidize one group of agents either directly (low, zero or even negative price) or 
indirectly through tying a valuable product (free internet query, free radio broadcasting) 
with a product establishing negative network externalities (advertisement).  
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Very close to the latter interpretation and related to the formal resolution of two-
sided market models, two-sided markets can be seen as ordinary markets with the 
product being the provision of a client base which exhibits acquiring expenses equalling 
the loss on a second product offered to that client base. Thereby, acquiring takes place 
indirectly by offering a valuable, subsidized service (free internet query). In most of the 
cases, this valuable product inhibits substantial economies of scale (and only indirect 
network externalities over the other side of the market) which in turn reduce acquiring 
cost per client, whereas the marginal indirect revenue remains constant. Consequently, 
two-sided markets are heavily concentrated.  
5.2.2. Two-sidedness of the postal market 
We now turn to the important question whether postal markets are two-sided 
markets according to the definition of Rochat and Tirole (2005) cited above.  
Today, in most postal markets it is secured that any address is connected to the 
postal network by means of the “universal service obligation” that obliges as least one 
postal network to provide “universal access” for universal services such as letters and 
parcels and to deliver that service to any address throughout the country. Thus, by 
regulation, network externalities are secured. Additionally, universal providers are – for 
example in Switzerland – by law not allowed to charge the receiver’s for connecting 
them to net network. Even New Zealand, where the postal market is since a decade fully 
liberalized and universal service was reduced to its basics, forbids in its “deed of 
understanding” with New Zealand Post a “rural delivery fee” aimed at residents in 
remote areas. Those universal service definitions indicate that senders exhibit a positive 
network externality if everybody is connected to the postal network.  
However, it is not yet clear whether total demand is affected by a change in the 
pricing structure, for example if postage was to be paid by receivers instead of senders 
at it was the case before the reform of Rowland Hill. History on the reform of Rowland 
Hill reveals that demand virtually exploded after the change in the price structure. 
Thus, we have a first indication of the two-sidedness of the postal market.  
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Research by Felisberto et al. (2006) on the receiver pays principle in the postal 
sector analyzes the effects of the introduction of a delivery flat rate, where receivers are 
given the choice between free P.O. box delivery and costly last mile doorstep delivery 
(in the form of a yearly flat rate). 68 This would enable a monopolistic platform to reduce 
senders’ tariffs. By exclusion of a rebalancing between the two groups of agents behind 
the scenes and by assumption that P.O. box switchers originate the same amount of mail 
as before, positive demand effects were found. 
More recent research by Friedli et al. (2006) on the delivery flat rate indicates that 
up to 35% of the customers switching to P.O. box delivery would not anymore empty 
their mail box. This would cause a significant drop in mail volumes. This survey points 
towards the presence of two-sidedness in the postal market.  
A similar argument is the following. If the receiver was about to pay, the sender 
has no guarantee that the receiver accepts the mail (for example, paying postage for 
accepting unwanted direct mailings). Receivers would most probably reject unwanted 
mail, which in turn postal operators would send back to the senders by charging them 
accordingly. This would reduce response rates clearly and reduce the amount of direct 
mail sent as observed in Chile.  
A contrary argument might be that most senders of transactional mail bill their 
postage onwards to the receivers. Thereby, single peace tariffs instead of (lower) 
business customer tariffs are charged. Thus, receivers perceived cost might reduce if 
postal operators would bill the postage directly to the receivers (positive demand effect). 
We conclude that there exists large evidence that postal markets indeed are two-
sided. This was first recognized by Panzar (2006). Our main contribution to the 
literature is the formalization of a competitive two-sided postal market which we 
calibrate to yield robust results on optimal pricing strategies.  
                                                     
68  Jaag (2007) discusses the welfare effects associated with the consumers’ choice between 
costly doorstep delivery and free delivery to a P.O. box. 
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5.3 A two-sided postal market model 
Our two-sided postal market model consists of two groups of agents, namely 
senders and receivers of mail, and two platforms (postal operators) linking the senders 
and the receivers. Senders choose over whom to hand over their mail, whereas receivers 
have the possibility to grant special delivery rights to one of the two operators69. The 
assumption of special rights involves the necessity of interconnection of the two 
operators; In order to offer end-to-end service to her sender, a postal operator needs 
access to the other’s delivery network. Otherwise, an operator would not be able to 
reach P.O. box addresses operated by the other one. We are primarily interested, how 
different interconnection rates affect the platforms pricing strategies, thus we treat 
access prices as exogenous and provide in Section 5.4 sensitivity analysis. For simplicity 
reasons, we assume reciprocal access pricing. 
Thus, there are two sides in the postal market: Upstream, postal operators 
compete for sending customers; downstream, they compete for receiving customers. We 
follow Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) in the modeling of network competition and link 
the postal upstream market on the sender’s side to a downstream market for local 
delivery monopolies.  
Figure 19 provides a graphical representation of the model outline. In our model, 
total mail demand is a function of the sum of the sender’s price pu and the receiver’s 
price pd per item. Total volume is determined by the sender primarily, but we assume 
that through private redistribution (as observed in practice) the receiver influences the 
sender’s communication channel and vice versa. We include the possibility that the 
operators’ optimal behavior leads to an interdependence of these prices and a delivery 
                                                     
69  In most countries, receivers have the choice between a free doorstep delivery and 
(sometimes costly) P.O. box. It is important to note that as soon as a P.O. box is chosen, the 
P.O. box operator obtains the exclusive rights for final delivery into the P.O. box. In this 
view, the assumption could reflect the subset of mail destined to P.O. boxes, or a 
regulation where every household appoints the operator of her choice as its exclusive 
delivery carrier. 
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flat rate, such that total volume is sensitive to reallocations of the total price. Hence, the 
model qualifies as a two-sided market (with multihoming).  
Figure 19: Model outline 
 
 
As opposed to e.g. the telecommunications market, the two user bases (senders, 
receivers) are not necessarily linked together: A subscriber for delivery services with one 
operator does not predetermine the operator choice when sending a letter (P.O. box 
holders can still send the mail with other carriers). However, downstream market share 
affect both cost structure and downstream income, which determines competitive 
behavior upstream. 
In both parts of the market, consumers can chose between two competing 
networks i and j, which are differentiated à la Hotelling. Given income y and mail 
consumption q, a consumer (sender / receiver) located at x and joining network i has 
utility 
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We assume that consumers are uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1] and 
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preference x. Thus, a consumer located at x = 0.5 is just about equally dissatisfied by the 
two operators i and j located at xi = 0 and xj = 1 and finds herself indifferent. Following 
Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) we define sender gross surplus Uu(q) by  
( )
η
β ηη 11
111
−
=
−
qqUu   
We allow for redistribution of tariffs between senders and receivers by specifying 
the total quantity as a function both of the senders price pu and the receivers price pd. If 
for example a bank client orders the monthly bank statement knowing that the postage 
will be charged on her bank account, receivers generate the mail, and the senders price 
still affects mail volumes although they do not actually pay for it. Similarly, if the client 
was charged a reception fee, this would again affect senders demand. Hence, sender’s 
utility maximization yields total demand  
( ) ηζβ −+⋅= idiu ppq ,,  
with constant price elasticity of demand -η. ζ reflects to what degree customers can 
redistribute postage by means of private negotiation and hence, to what degree senders 
take into account the receiver price. With ζ close to 0, senders’ demand is independent of 
the receiver price (resulting from the lack of negotiation between senders and receivers). 
ζ = 1 yields a situation where the sender maximizes over the aggregate variable price 
level, irrespective of the tariff structure. However, the market still qualifies the two-
sided markets property as long as the fixed downstream reception fee Pd is nonzero (in 
the literature referred to as “delivery flat rate”). For Pd = 0, senders and receivers would 
be able to redistribute (pass through) charges behind the scene completely to the very 
same level irrespective of the operators’ pricing strategies. 
The total cost for end-to-end postal service consists of a fixed part fm in both the 
upstream (m=u) and downstream markets (m=d) and quantity-dependent variable cost 
cm: 
( )dudu ccqffC +⋅++= . 
– 86 –  
The operators’ profit functions are then given by 
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where αm,i is market share of operator i in market m. Hence, a postal operator’s 
profit consists of three parts: The first part is due to letters she processes end-to-end. The 
second and the third ones relate to mails which originate in the own network and which 
are delivered through the other operator’s network, and vice versa. 
To solve the model, we derive the competitive outcome in the two sides of the 
postal market consecutively. Thereby, the model is solved backwards in order to find 
subgame perfect equilibria. In a first step, we analyze upstream competition in non-
discriminatory linear tariffs, where the two networks compete for senders and yield 
optimal prices and market share in the upstream market as a function of equilibrium 
downstream prices and market shares. In a second step, we derive optimal two-part 
pricing structures70 of the downstream market, i.e. competition for P.O. box subscribers.  
We focus on parameter constellations, in which there exist unique and symmetric 
equilibria in both the upstream and downstream markets (cf. Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 
1998, propositions 1 and 7). 
5.3.1. Upstream competition in non-discriminatory linear tariffs 
We start our analysis with upstream competition, where postal operators compete 
for quantity. At that stage, downstream prices pd*, Pd* and market shares αd* are given 
from downstream competition and are symmetric. Under the assumption of uniform 
and non-discriminatory pricing (i.e. the postal operator is not able to discriminate mail 
by destination), the sender’s net surplus in the upstream market is 
                                                     
70  I.e. the pricing for P.O. boxes consists of a fixed and a variable part where both parts can 
be positive (receiver pays), negative (receiver obtains) or zero (no money flow in either 
direction). 
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Operator i’s market share is therefore 
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1≡σ  is an index of substitutability resulting from the location of the 
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In symmetric equilibrium, we have 5.0*,
*
, == iuid αα , **,*, ujuiu ppp ==   and 
**
,
*
, djdid ppp == . The first-order condition of (14) with respect to pu is  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 0
2
1'
4
1
2
1'
4
1
2
1'
4
1
**,*
*,
*
,
**,*
=−+−+∂
∂−+−++
−+−−∂
∂++−−+
+−−+−−+∂
∂++−−+
ududd
u
iu
dd
uduuu
u
iu
uu
iddudududu
u
iu
dudu
fppqcap
p
qqcap
fppqcap
p
qqcap
Pffppqccpp
p
qqccpp
ζα
ζα
ζα
. 
Note that a unit increase in price lowers market share by uσ  times quantity per 
customer: qp uiuiu σα −=∂∂ ,, /  and a unit loss of market share leads to the loss of the per-
customer profit. In analogy to equation (8) in Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998), the first-
order condition can be rewritten as 
( )[ ]***** ,,211 dduu
u
u Ppp
p
p πση
κ −=− , 
where 
2
*
dd
u
pcac −++=κ  is perceived direct marginal cost and  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ddududududdu PffppqccppPpp +−−+−−+= ζπ 21,,   
is per-customer profit when the two networks charge identical prices. 
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5.3.2. Downstream competition in two-part tariffs 
In upstream competition, downstream prices pd*, Pd* and market shares αd* have 
been taken as given. They are determined in downstream competition, where postal 
operators compete for market share. Again, differentiation is à la Hotelling. Thereby, 
operators can build local monopolies, which strengthen their market power upstream. 
Receiver net surplus from chosen network i is 
( ) ididddid Ppvvw ,,0,, −+= . 
Receiver surplus net of per-piece price pd,i is in analogy to above denoted by vd . 
We introduce the term vd,0 to assure that every receiver is interested in joining one of the 
two delivery networks. Since a fraction ζ of this price is passed on to senders, we have 
( ) qpqUpv iddidd ,, )1()( ζ−−= , 
such that operator i’s market share is 
[ ]jdiddid ww ,,, 21 −+≡ σα  with dd t2
1≡σ . 
We assume Ud(q) such that  
qpv idd −=)(' , .  
Then, the first-order condition to (14) with respect to pd,i yields  
( ) ( )iuiuiuiuidid cpacp ,,,,,, 1 −−−−= αα  
or, in a symmetric equilibrium, 
( )iuiuidid cpacp ,,,, 2121 −−−= . 
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Hence, the networks’ optimal downstream usage fee equals perceived marginal 
cost. Downstream market share is unaffected by it. However, the symmetric equilibrium 
subscriber fee determines the size of the downstream user base. It is given by 
did
i
id d
dP σα
π
2
1
,
, +−=  
and therefore equal to the net marginal cost of adding a subscriber to the 
downstream network plus the Hotelling markup. 
Each unit loss of downstream market share implies a profit loss of 
( ) ( ) dddudd
id
i Pfppqcp
d
d +−+−= ζα
π
,
  
which is per-customer downstream profit when the two networks charge identical 
prices. 
5.4 Simulation results and discussion 
Our main goal is to derive optimal pricing structures in liberalized postal markets, 
where potentially all involved parties (senders, receivers, operators) can exert their 
bargaining power. Senders have the choice over competing operators; receivers can 
exclusively attribute a postal operator as their delivery partner of choice; and operators 
can establish a consumer base on one side of the market and sell it to the other one.  
A calibration of the model enables us to numerically compute the operators’ 
optimal pricing strategies as a function of the reciprocal interconnection rate. We 
calibrate the model to correspond roughly to the size and the characteristics of the Swiss 
letter market. The number of receivers is equal to 4m households and businesses. The 
current volume of addressed letters is 2.8bn at an average price of CHF 0.75 with price 
elasticity η = 0.2771. Utility parameter β is calibrated to 650 to represent the Swiss letter 
                                                     
71  For a discussion of demand parameters cf. Trinkner and Grossmann (2006). 
– 90 –  
market with approximately 700 letters per year and receiver. Total cost is CHF 2bn.72 
With roughly 50% delivery cost of which 50% are fixed and a fraction of fixed cost of 
30% in collection and processing, we calibrate fu , cu , fd ,and cd accordingly. Moreover, we 
set σu = σd = 0.2.  
The following observations and results apply for the calibration as above. Other 
calibrations might yield different optimal pricing strategies. Note that Switzerland 
exhibits a very high postal scale73. Moreover, given the rough calibration and the 
stylized model, the results are only indicative. 
Figure 20 displays the optimal pricing strategies depending on the exogenously set 
access price. We ran simulations with various values of ζ. Black lines are computed with  
ζ = 0.25, dark grey lines with ζ = 0.5 and light grey lines with ζ = 0.75.  
Figure 20: Optimal pricing structure depending on interconnection rate 
 
 
 
                                                     
72  For a discussion of the cost structure of the Swiss mail market, cf. Dietl et al. (2005) and 
Jaag (2006). 
73 See also PWC (2006). 
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Observation 1 – Optimal pricing structure: The results replicate the pricing 
structure as observed in the completely liberalized postal market of New Zealand when 
market participants agreed on symmetric access prices to P.O. boxes. Given a similar 
regulatory regime, as set out in the model, we find an optimal pricing strategy in two-
sided postal markets as follows: If the interconnection rate is about CHF 0.6, charge your 
key receivers a yearly delivery flat rate between CHF 250 and 300. In turn, for every 
mail piece you deliver now exclusively, you pay (not charge!) your client (the receiver) 
about CHF 0.3 per mail piece (i.e. pd is negative). On the sender side, you charge about 
0.7 per piece. In such a setting, given upstream and downstream variable costs and 
before considering fixed costs, net profits on end-to-end services are about break even, 
whereas upstream services incur a loss (pu – a < cu) and downstream products are 
profitable (a + pd > cd).  
The results indicate that competition in two-sided postal markets forces operators 
to strongly cross-subsidize large receivers. 
Figure 21 and Figure 22 show the effect of an increase of the interconnection rate 
on operators’ profit per customer and mail volumes.  
Figure 21: Postal operator profit per customer 
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Figure 22: Mail Volumes 
 
 
 
Observation 2 – Effect of interconnection charge: Increasing interconnection rates 
make the downstream business more attractive (higher earnings for downstream 
operators) and results in fiercer downstream competition. This forces the operators to 
give their subscribers higher per piece incentives (more negative pd), which are funded 
by higher stamp prices. Partly, operators can recover higher incentives by higher 
subscriber fees, too. Note that the receivers’ incentives grow faster than the stamp price 
due to the increased relative importance of downstream market shares (which are the 
basis for downstream profits). Interestingly, receivers’ average price (pd + Pd/q) becomes 
negative for high interconnection rates, i.e. they become subsidized and even make a 
profit by being connected to the postal network. Importantly, this redistribution comes 
at the cost of the networks, not at the cost of the senders, as the latter benefit from the 
receivers’ better bargaining position by means of private rebalancing, which yields a 
lower price level pd + pd and thus higher mail volumes q.  
Thus, if we can exclude tacit collusion, high interconnection rates make the 
industry unattractive, as receivers are given a high bargaining position by means of 
regulation. 
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Observation 3 – Effect of private redistribution: A higher value of ζ enables 
senders and receivers better to offset pricing structures by means of private 
redistribution. Recapitulate that at the extreme (ζ = 1) complete pass-through of per 
piece prices takes place such that mail volumes q(p) depend just on the sum of the two 
variable prices p = pu + pd. Hence, the mail originating side includes total marginal 
postage into its calculations.  
Since the downstream price pd is negative, such redistribution leads to a 
participation of senders in downstream incentives, which decreases their perceived costs 
and thereby increases volumes (cf. Figure 22) and profits (cf. Figure 21). Put differently, 
if receivers not only are able to exert their market power towards the operators, but also 
towards the senders (lower value of ζ), we can expect negative demand effects and a 
significant drop of industry profits. 
Hence, if receivers not only are able to exert their market power towards the 
operators, but also towards the senders, we can expect negative demand effects and a 
significant drop of industry profits. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Practical evidence from postal markets suggests that mail markets are two-sided. 
Hence, postal operators are platforms that enable communication and transactions 
between two parties – senders/mailers on one side, and receivers/recipients on the 
other. This two-sidedness raises two main issues, network effects and pricing.  
Network effects are present in most two-sided markets, and most probably in 
postal markets too. We can expect the value of a postal network to increase the more 
customers are connected to it. We presume that the notion of ubiquitous access and 
delivery, which lies at the core of the universal service obligation, is to be seen in this 
context. We do not include network effects directly into our model (although indirect 
network effects between the upstream and downstream market are present) as we are 
primarily interested in the pricing implications of the two-sidedness of the postal 
market.    
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In terms of pricing, the two-sidedness makes things more complicated. Standard 
results of economic theory (related to one-sided markets) might fail in two-sided 
markets. Wright (2004) spells out “eight fallacies that arise from using one-sided logic in 
two-sided markets” and concludes that “the results may be very different from the 
normal marginal cost pricing familiar in one-sided markets”. In our model, the 
interconnection of the two sides (upstream and downstream) of the mail market yields 
interesting pricing considerations, which are a challenge for pricing departments as well 
as for regulators and competition authorities. In posts, recipients traditionally have been 
served by monopoly platforms that charged the senders and served receivers free of 
charge. This still holds true in virtually any industrialized country. For example, Swiss 
recipients get home delivery and P.O. boxes free of charge, the latter having the 
advantage of early morning delivery.  
How do things change in liberalized two-sided mail markets? Will receivers 
remain subsidized? Our results indicate that in liberalized markets at least key receivers 
will be subsidized even stronger at the cost of the postal industry. Depending on P.O. 
box regulations, the optimal strategy of postal operators towards receivers will be to 
offer them a costly P.O. box while paying them money for every mail piece delivered to 
this P.O. box. Thereby, large receivers will succeed in capitalizing on their address. Such 
a pricing would have harmful effects on overall mail volumes unless senders participate 
accordingly (unlikely for the case of direct mail). We conclude that it is very risky for 
postal operators to introduce receivers’ pricing or incentives. This result may not hold 
for value added services. The results raise the more general question of who should pay 
for postal services from a welfare point of view. Jaag (2007) proposes a model 
framework to address such issues.  
The current common regulatory view states that P.O. boxes are monopolistic 
bottlenecks with a respective need of access regulation. This is somewhat astonishing as 
there are no sunk costs related to P.O. box provision (cf. Table 6). Our two-sided model 
suggests that we can expect competition for P.O. boxes as observed in New Zealand74 
and that operators have a common interest for low access prices. Hence, in terms of P.O. 
box regulations, our results contradict the common view. We leave it for further 
                                                     
74 Nee Zealand Post currently holds about 90% market share in P.O. box provision. 
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research to assess whether this holds also true for models with asymmetric equilibria. 
However, as Panzar (2006) points out, the two-sidedness of the postal market makes 
access regulation to P.O. boxes a rather complex task and cost based pricing rules rather 
inappropriate. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
In this book we asked whether Switzerland should open its letters market 
completely to competition. From an economic point of view this question comes down 
to the aim of maximizing the long run overall welfare in Switzerland subject to certain 
constraints. Such constraints could be the set of politically feasible regulations, social 
objectives that arise from market failures, or ensuring the provision of universal postal 
services.  
6.1 Two conflicting concepts: Universal Service and Free Market 
Universal service is a major concern in the postal market75 and faces great attention 
throughout the liberalization processes in Europe and elsewhere. Thereby, some core 
elements of the so called universal service obligation (USO) such as affordable and 
uniform prices directly conflict with the notion of pure competition where the “invisible 
hand”, the free pricing mechanism, ensures that supply and demand balance. Hence, 
free competition (prices = marginal costs) and universal service obligations (prices = 
uniform) are in a natural conflict as the former can only work at its best if prices are 
determined in the market and not in a political process. A similar argument can be made 
in terms of scope and quality of universal services.  
Hence, one first challenge for policy makers is to ensure the fulfillment of USO 
while providing a level playing field that offers a prosperous base for effective and 
welfare improving competition with consumers’ choice over a great variety of fairly 
priced products based on an efficient service provision by postal operators. As long as 
the USO constraints are economically binding (i.e. the cost of the USO76 is positive), the 
                                                     
75 Positive externalities associated to universal postal services offer an economic 
interpretation of the broad political response to any change related to USO. Cf. Dietl and 
Trinkner (2008) for a discussion of the economic importance of universal postal services.   
76 See Cremer et al. (2000), Panzar (2001), Oxera (2006), Dietl et al. (2007) or Jaag et al. (2009) 
for guidance on how to calculate the Cost of USO. Note that this “Cost of the Universal 
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market will not provide the universal services as requested and thus market 
interventions (regulations) become necessary. In principle, two concepts are on the table. 
Firstly, one might impose USO constraints on any operator. This solution is less 
demanding in terms of regulation but might be inefficient77 or raise barriers to entry 
which conflicts the aim of market opening. Secondly, one might designate just one 
operator who has to comply with USO constraints (ex ante or by public procurement). 
Ensuring a level playing field involves an adequate compensation of the designated 
universal service provider either through external funds such as government subsidies 
or through a compensation fund mechanism as foreseen in the current Swiss postal law 
where operators other than the universal service provider contribute according to their 
turnover78.   
Our calculations show that such a compensation fund – given the current USO of 
Switzerland – only succeeds if the licensing fees are set at level that almost entirely 
prevents entry.  Hence, government subsidies might be the only stable solution allowing 
for competition with operators other than the incumbent. However, such subsidies raise 
the floor for inefficient entries (by sustaining the incumbent’s higher mark ups in low 
cost areas) that moreover increase the financing need for providing the USO.  
In light of these considerations, the only suitable solution might be to reduce the 
USO itself and to align it as much as possible with the market. Prominent ambassadors 
of this standpoint are Crew and Kleindorfer (2006b, p. 13): “… under entry the USO will 
have to decrease if inefficient subsidies and compensation funds are to be avoided. We 
also showed that there is a trade-off between USO and the level of competitiveness [of 
the USP] for business customers.” Into the same direction points the impact assessment 
                                                                                                                                                              
Service Obligation” matters for determining the financing needs whereas the “Cost of the 
Universal Service” or the “Profit of the USO provider” do not provide any guidance.   
77 Consider a case as Switzerland where the post office network is part of the USO. Such a 
system would yield – if market entries ever occurred – to far too many post offices. 
78  “Pay or play” mechanisms somehow mix the two systems. Operators can avoid to 
“paying” into the compensation fund by “playing”, i.e. providing the USO too. Note that 
tendering is a method to allocate the USO, not a financing mechanism by itself. See Jaag 
and Trinkner (2008b) for a discussion on tendering USO in liberalized markets. 
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of PWC on behalf of the European Commission (PWC 2006a, p. 23) which recommends 
to “adapt the USO to market conditions”, that is:   
“We use the term ‘adapting the USO to market conditions’ to mean generally 
achieving a better alignment of price, cost and value for USO services. This might 
include, for example, using postal employees to provide services in rural areas as part 
of their routes rather than at fixed counters, increased use of franchised operations, 
increasing the stamp price, and eliminating uniformity requirements on business-
originated mail. Adapting the USO could also mean changing the constraints on 
accessibility for counters and collection services as populations and demand for postal 
services change over time.“ 
We conclude that the natural conflict between competition and USO is not to be 
neglected in the postal sector. Crew and Kleindorfer (2006b, p. 13) summarize: “The 
more stringent is the competition from entrants, the higher the burden of the USO […], 
and the lower the scope of the welfare-optimal level of USO.” This trade-off between 
USO and competition is of particular importance in Switzerland where the market is 
attractive to new entrants and the level of USO is comparably high79. PWC (2006b) 
illustrates the trade-off and gives guidance on the deficit one has to expect for the 
universal service provider after a full market opening keeping USO constraints 
unchanged. We conclude with a statement by Crew and Kleindorfer (2006a p. 21): “All 
of this raises the broader question of whether the USO has had its day.”  
6.2 Impact of a Full Market Opening on Welfare 
The previous remarks indicate the difficulties in finding a suitable financing 
instrument for the USO that enables “workable” competition at the same time. Things 
get even more complex if one wants to consider the impact on overall welfare too.  
Our results in Chapter 4 indicate that a full market opening yields only welfare 
improvements if accompanied with a price freeze for the incumbent and massive 
                                                     
79 See for example Finger (2007), PostReg (2006) or  PWC (2006b). 
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subsidies to compensate its resulting burden80. In all other scenarios, our model predicts 
a loss of overall welfare which is in line with many studies undertaken on the subject.  
Hence the trade-off between competition and universal service reveals itself as a trade-
off between universal service obligations on the one hand and the universal service 
provider’s financial burden and a respective need for subsidies on the other. For 
example, the more restrictions are imposed on the incumbent’s pricing flexibility the 
worse becomes the financial situation of the incumbent.  
In contrast to our assessment of the European way to foster competition in the 
mail industry, our analysis yields better results for the US regulations which base on a 
rigid letters monopoly but allow for upstream innovation and competition. In line with 
the literature, we predict higher welfare and much better USP stability than various 
ways of end-to-end competition.  
We conclude that Switzerland should be very cautious when copying European 
plans of end-to-end competition. We believe caution is especially indicated if our 
estimation results of high economies of scale and density in delivery truly reflect the 
industry. Our calculations predict that complete letter market liberalization will lead to 
higher prices, to increased price differentiation between regions and customers (in favor 
of business customers and cities), and to an erosion of universal services due to 
continuous financial pressure on the universal service provider. These problems will 
even tighten if a full market opening was combined with an access regime under which 
competitors could use the incumbent’s delivery network when and where needed.  
Our model cannot cope with some dynamic advantages of competition. For 
example, we did not model dynamic efficiency gains of Swiss Post differently under 
end-to-end competition compared to monopoly scenarios. If one believes those 
efficiency potentials to be large, then end-to-end competition could still be a desirable 
solution. However, postal services already face increasing indirect competition through 
digital means of written communication. Despite growing written communication 
markets, overall mail volumes are shrinking in most highly developed countries 
including Switzerland. This rapidly evolving “e-competition” threatens the postal 
                                                     
80 PWC (2006b) provides similar results. 
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services in a similar way as end-to-end competition does. This raises competitive 
pressure with a respective need for efficiency and innovation which is independent of 
liberalization. Thereby, it is crucial that the industry finds ways to successfully position 
itself in this broader market for communications and advertisement where prices for 
digital deliveries are marginal. Should postal operators primarily focus on market 
positioning against each other by climbing down the quality latter, the industry might 
find itself in a difficult situation. Fortunately, first success stories from overseas are on 
the table. 
In sum one might ask where the overall welfare gains of a full market opening 
should stem from. If solid pressure for cost reductions is present independently of 
liberalization81, if the relative effect on innovation is indeed limited82, if a duplification of 
networks is inevitable and thus economies of scale and density are less exploited, if one 
has to expect an increase at least in retail prices, and if postal markets are two-sided, 
ours and many others’ results might give adequate guidance of what Switzerland can 
expect from liberalizing its mail market completely: Welfare gains will be limited, and 
universal service obligations at risk. 
 
                                                     
81 Be it through e-substitution or modern incentive regulations. 
82 Andersson (2006): “The Swedish market is not significantly more innovative than other 
modern postal markets”. See Dietl et al. (2006) for the impact of end-to-end competition on 
incentives for innovation. 
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